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ABSTRACT 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were a watershed event in this country's 
history that significantly affected law enforcement agencies and organizations at all 
levels, including the FBI and the multidisciplinary Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The 
terrorist attacks served as a catalyst for evaluating cultural, psychological and 
organizational processes, policies and procedures that influenced the FBI and impacted 
the JTTF program. In 2006 a comprehensive study was conducted to investigate whether 
FBI provided JTTF members with the necessary tools to support their investigations. The 
study identified a number of deficiencies. In order to adapt and combat an emergent 
asymmetric threat, the JTTF must identify and analyze specific actions and best practices 
necessary to prepare, execute, and support strategic change and innovation and overcome 
obstacles that impede the process.  It is also necessary to identify and implement best 
and/or smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures that ensure the 
skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly 
integrated into the JTTF program. The implementation of standardized written 
procedures that detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases 
and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the 
JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the 
flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies in participant 
stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ................................................................2 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................4 
II. BACKGROUND ON CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR .........9 
A.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS.........10 
B.   RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC CHANGE .................................................15 
C. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND STRATEGY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM..........................................................................22 
D.  INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION.......................................................28 
III. CTD SURVEY RESULTS ........................................................................................31 
A.  METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................31 
1. Participants.........................................................................................31 
2. Procedure............................................................................................34 
3. Data Analysis......................................................................................36 
B. SUPPORT AND TRAINING........................................................................37 
1. Substantive Training .........................................................................37 
a. International Terrorism Training ..........................................38 
b. Domestic Terrorism Training.................................................41 
c.  Weapons of Mass Destruction Training ................................44 
d. Muslim-Arab Culture Training..............................................47 
e.  Legal Training.........................................................................50 
f. Training Comments by JTTF Members.................................52 
2. Investigative Tools .............................................................................53 
a. National Security Letters ........................................................53 
b.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Requests ......55 
3.  Database Access and Training..........................................................57 
a.  Database Access ......................................................................57 
b.  Database Training ..................................................................62 
c.  Database and Systems Comments by JTTF Members...........67 
C. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ..........................................67 
1.  Participation in Investigations ..........................................................67 
2.  Sources and Source Training............................................................69 
3.  Access to Support Personnel .............................................................71 
4. Briefings Provided by FBI Field Office ...........................................74 
5.  Field Office Leadership and Management Skills............................75 
6.  Final Comments by JTTF Members ................................................78 
D. REVISION OF THE MASTER JTTF FIELD MEMBERSHIP 
ROSTER .........................................................................................................79 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY RESULTS ............................................................81 
 viii
V. RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................................................87 
A. TRAINING DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION..................................88 
1. Curriculum and Implementation .....................................................92 
B. MENTORING/FIELD TRAINING OFFICER PROGRAM ....................95 
C. LESSONS LEARNED/BEST PRACTICES PROGRAM .........................96 
D. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY................................................101 
E. COLLABORATION IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES 
(CHICAGO CASE STUDY) .......................................................................103 
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................107 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS .................................................107 
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS................................................108 
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................110 
APPENDIX A: NJTTF REGIONAL MAP..............................................................111 
APPENDIX B:  RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO THE JTTF 
TELEPHONE SURVEY .........................................................................................113 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................129 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................133 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. JTTF members selected for the survey (705) compared to those who 
completed the survey   (447), by agency membership.....................................34 
Figure 2. International terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 
for "Any IT training" and 409 for “FBIHQ IT training,” “FBI FO IT 
training,” and “non-FBI IT training.” ..............................................................38 
Figure 3. Quality ratings for international terrorism training received.  Sample sizes 
are as follows: 327 for "FBIHQ IT training," 231 for "FBI FO IT training," 
and 205 for “non-FBI IT training.”..................................................................39 
Figure 4. IT training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region 
I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....................40 
Figure 5. IT training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample 
sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, and 201 
for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members. ..........................................41 
Figure 6. Domestic terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for 
"Any DT training" and 364 for “FBIHQ DT training,” “FBI FO DT 
training,” and “non-FBI DT training.”.............................................................42 
Figure 7. Quality ratings for domestic terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are 
as follows: 296 for "FBIHQ DT training," 119 for "FBI FO DT training," 
and 108 for “non-FBI DT training.” ................................................................43 
Figure 8. T training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region 
I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.....................43 
Figure 9. DT training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample 
sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for 
FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members. ................................................44 
Figure 10. Weapons of mass destruction training received.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 447 for "Any WMD training," and 301 for “FBIHQ WMD 
training,” “FBI FO WMD training” and “non-FBI WMD training”. ..............45 
Figure 11. Quality ratings for weapons of mass destruction training received.  Sample 
sizes are as follows: 164 for "FBI HQ WMD training," 105 for "FBI FO 
WMD training," and 147 for “non-FBI WMD training.” ................................46 
Figure 12. Figure 12 WMD training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows:  
ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for 
Region IV.........................................................................................................46 
Figure 13. WMD training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample 
sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for 
FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members. ................................................47 
Figure 14. Muslim-Arab culture training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 
for "Any MAC training" and 348 for “FBI HQ MAC training,” “FBI FO 
MAC training,” and “non-FBI MAC training.”...............................................48 
Figure 15. Figure 15 Quality ratings for Muslim-Arab culture training received.  
Sample sizes are as follows: 179 for "FBI HQ MAC training," 210 for 
"FBI FO MAC training," and 136 for “non-FBI MAC training.” ...................49 
 x
Figure 16. Figure 16 MAC training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 
ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for 
Region IV.........................................................................................................49 
Figure 17. Figure 17: MAC training received by JTTF status and agency 
membership.  Sample sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for 
FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members. .............50 
Figure 18. Legal training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one 
for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV...51 
Figure 19. Legal training by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are 
as follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI 
members, and 245 for non-FBI members. .......................................................52 
Figure 20. NSL requests by region.  Sample sizes are as follows:  ninety-one for 
Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV. .......54 
Figure 21. NSL requests by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are 
as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI 
members and 245 for non-FBI members. ........................................................55 
Figure 22. FISA requests by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for 
Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV. .......56 
Figure 23. FISA requests by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are 
as follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI 
members and 245 for non-FBI members. ........................................................57 
Figure 24. 447 JTTF members’ access to databases and systems.....................................58 
Figure 25. 447 JTTF members’ access to databases and systems compared to training 
received. ...........................................................................................................63 
Figure 26. JTTF Members who have been assigned as either primary or co-case agent 
(from survey of 447) and those who have participated in file review 
sessions (from survey of 350). .........................................................................68 
Figure 27. Source training by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for 
Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV. .......70 
Figure 28. Figure 28 Source training by agency membership.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 201 for FBI JTTF members and 245 for non-FBI JTTF members....71 
Figure 29. JTTF Members access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts 
(FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical 
coverage. ..........................................................................................................72 
Figure 30. JTTF Members’ access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts 
(FA), Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical 
support by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 
103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region I. ..........................73 
Figure 31. Frequency of briefings to TFO Management by FBI. .....................................75 
Figure 32. 447 JTTF members’ ratings of FBI field office management on leadership 
skills.  Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing 
data were not included. ....................................................................................76 
Figure 33. Figure 33 JTTF Members’ ratings of FBI field office Management on 
leadership skills.  Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings 
and missing data were not included. ................................................................77 
 xi
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Training comments. .........................................................................................53 
Table 2. JTTF members with various database accesses, training on those 
databases, and opinions regarding the usefulness of those databases..............59 
Table 3. JTTF members database accesses by region....................................................60 
Table 4. JTTF members database accesses by status and agency membership. ............62 
Table 5. JTTF members’ database accesses compared to training received..................64 
Table 6. JTTF members with database training compared to membership status. ........65 
Table 7. JTTF members’ database training by agency membership..............................66 
Table 8. Database and systems comments. ....................................................................67 
Table 9. Support personnel comments...........................................................................74 
Table 10. Final comments................................................................................................78 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank the dedicated instructors at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security, for creating an exciting and interesting 
environment for learning and for expanding my knowledge concerning Homeland 
Security matters. Special thanks to Chris Bellavita, whose constructive criticism took me 
out of my comfort zone and made me a better writer. I want to thank my fellow students 
whose keen insights, divergent perspectives, and lively discussions enhanced my learning 
experience.  I would also like to thank my thesis advisors, Cassandra Cochran and David 
Brannan, for their guidance and assistance throughout the thesis process.  My thanks, as 
well, to those who assisted in the editorial process: Alis Gumbiner, Cassandra Cochran, 
and Kathy Carleson. 
I would like to thank Ricardo Page, Merthan Beck, and Ron Rybicki at the NJTTF 
who provided information and insight critical to the recommendations portion of this 
work.  I am especially thankful to Cassandra Cochran, the principal architect of the JTTF 
survey, whose collaboration and critical feedback contributed to this work. Finally I 
would like to thank Eryn, whose companionship made my time in Monterey enjoyable.   
I dedicate this work to the devoted local, state, and federal law enforcement 
partners on the JTTF whose efforts keep our homeland safe. 
 
 xiv




A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were a watershed 
event in this country's history and a transformational event for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  The attacks provided the impetus for the FBI to reexamine 
traditional roles and responsibilities and initiate the organizational and cultural changes 
necessary to refocus resources to combat emergent asymmetrical threats. The need for 
change was magnified by the failures manifested by the 9/11 attacks. The FBI fell under 
intense criticism from Congressional investigatory committees and independent 
commissions. Most notable was the 9/11 Commission, which cited the FBI and the 
intelligence community with failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and 
management.  Bureaucratic and cultural obstacles were exposed in the FBI's failure to 
gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.  The attacks exposed deficiencies 
concerning information sharing, coordination, and collaboration issues between law 
enforcement and intelligence community partners. 
The above issues have likewise impacted the multidisciplinary Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs). Under the purview of the FBI, local JTTFs are recognized as the 
primary domestic mechanisms for collecting intelligence, investigating suspicious 
incidents, and coordinating local terrorism investigations. The JTTF is also the principal 
conduit for sharing information and intelligence with state and local law enforcement. 
Post 9/11, local JTTFs have experienced dramatic change and explosive growth with task 
force involvement tripling in a five-year period. During that time local JTTFs expanded 
from approximately thirty-five to 102 locations nationwide, with state and local law 
enforcement participation on JTTFs growing exponentially as well.  By the fall of 2006 
JTTF participation grew to include approximately 4,459 part-time and full-time personnel 
representing multiple federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  In light of this 
brisk growth and extraordinary change, the JTTF mission of detecting, disrupting, and 
preventing terrorist attacks in the United States is contingent upon optimal collaboration 
and participation.  
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The rapid expansion of the JTTF Program has not been without challenges. Most 
state, local, and federal agencies that contribute resources and personnel to JTTFs are 
traditional law enforcement agencies that focus on the investigation and prosecution of 
criminal matters. Like the FBI, most if not all of these agencies are also facing cultural 
and transformational challenges post 9/11 while grappling with new roles, 
responsibilities, and priorities. In as much as personnel detailed to the local JTTFs have 
varying degrees of counterterrorism training, education and/or experience prior to 
assignment, is the FBI and JTTF providing the tools and training necessary to optimized 
participation?   Are procedures and processes in place to adequately familiarize newly 
assigned TFOs with FBI and Department of Justice investigative guidelines, 
classification policies, security issues, and administrative processes? Are task force 
officers (TFOs) provided proper orientation and mentoring to ensure they can efficiently 
document, draft, and disseminate intelligence and information generated in conjunction 
with counterterrorism investigations?  Is the current training and education curriculum 
provided by the FBI adequate and is it applied in a systematic, fair, and consistent 
manner? Finally, is FBI executive leadership capable of implementing strategic change to 
transform and culturally institutionalize innovative processes that consistently and 
uniformly develop and cultivate the core capabilities and tools necessary to achieve JTTF 
goals and objectives? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
In response to the criticism and challenges identified above, a shift and/or 
transformation concerning the FBI’s strategic focus was promulgated by FBI Director 
Robert Mueller immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This transformation was 
driven by a detailed strategic plan to establish objectives, priorities and delineate an 
organizational mission.1 The urgency to shift strategic focus was reinforced by and 
                                                 
 1 Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI transformation in strategic focus and reorganization 
included the following elements: (1) refocusing FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning the FBI 
workforce to address these priorities; (3) shifting FBI management and operational environment to enhance 
flexibility, agility, effectiveness, and accountability; (4) restructuring FBI headquarters; and (5) 
reengineering internal business practices and processes. 
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articulated in the 2004 - 2009 FBI Strategic Plan.2 As part of the transformation process, 
and in response to the passage of the Patriot Act and implementation of new Attorney 
General Guidelines, numerous new policies and programs that impacted local JTTFs 
were executed.  In light of new responsibilities, rapid growth, and expanded participation 
many of these policies, procedures, and programs were implemented in an incremental 
fashion, often in response to a problem, crisis or criticism. As such, the implementation 
and application of these policies and procedures has been disjointed, inconsistent, and 
less than optimal.  These inconsistencies and deficiencies were detailed in an external 
review conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in 2003 
and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 2005. In 
late 2006, the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) initiated a comprehensive survey 
which corroborated previous findings and identified additional shortcomings. 
This research is significant in as much as it includes the only survey focused 
solely on the JTTF Program, which adhered to research guidelines and methodology 
accepted by the scientific community. The 2006 CTD survey was the first comprehensive 
internal evaluation of the JTTF program.  The survey sought to establish a baseline or 
benchmark to assess the efficacy of core JTTF tools, capabilities, and processes. Eight 
core areas were identified and evaluated, including: (1) substantive training; (2) 
investigative tools; (3) database access and training; (4) participation in investigations; 
(5) sources; (6) access to support personnel; (7) information sharing in leadership and 
management; and (8) the effectiveness of FBI Field Office (FO) management. The 
aforementioned areas of review were identified as core competencies and necessary tools 
needed to optimize effectiveness and accomplish task force goals. Survey results were 
used to create a baseline whereby deficiencies that impede participation and collaboration 
could be identified and subsequent recommendations could be devised to improve the 
system. 
                                                 
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004-2009 Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d.). 
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Once survey results were analyzed and deficiencies recognized, relevant literature 
and studies were reviewed to identify practices that foster strategic change and promote 
collaboration in a multidisciplinary environment. This review included critical analysis of 
processes and systems that would enhance and sustain transformation, culturally 
institutionalize innovation, and promote consistency concerning core competencies. 
Before significant progress can be made in conjunction with organizational 
transformation, a number of questions must be resolved. Should the FBI discard the 
practice of incremental change in response crisis and/or criticism? Once a baseline is 
established and deficiencies identified will the FBI use the psychological and 
organizational drivers necessary to initiate and sustain systemic strategic change and 
innovation? What processes must be adopted to secure the necessary cooperation and 
collaboration of JTTF partners to make these changes work in a multidisciplinary 
environment?  Are processes and procedures in place to identify both internal and 
external organizational practices that optimize effectiveness and participation? Finally, 
under its current organizational structure, is the FBI prepared to identify and adopt best 
and/or smart practices, especially plans, policies, and procedures which ensure that the 
skills, experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly 
integrated into the JTTF Program? 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research was to investigate whether Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Division (CTD) is providing local JTTF members 
with the necessary tools to support their investigations.  Identified tools included access 
to support personnel, training and development, database access, level of involvement in 
counterterrorism investigations and source development, and effective leadership and 
management.  This research also sought to explore strategic change and innovation to 
identify drivers that organizations such as the FBI can utilize to optimize JTTF 
participation, develop core competencies, and fulfill organizational objectives.  Key 
practices and initiatives that promote multidisciplinary collaboration and coordination 
were also analyzed and evaluated. 
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The research that forms the basis of this thesis focused on the transformational 
period subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks which significantly impacted law 
enforcement agencies and organizations at all levels, including the FBI. The terrorist 
attacks were a catalyst for evaluating cultural, psychological, and organizational 
processes, policies and procedures that influenced the FBI and impacted the JTTF.  
Intense scrutiny and critical analysis by Congress, the DOJ, the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO), external commissions, and panels and agencies, and the virulent threat 
from al Qa’ida, has created a sense of organizational urgency to transform. The 
aforementioned panels and commissions identified deficiencies that, if not corrected, 
would hinder strategic change efforts.  Although organizational and strategic change had 
been initiated prior to 9/11, the terrorist attacks set in motion dramatic reforms articulated 
in the 2002 FBI Strategic Change Program. As this process evolved, the FBI adopted the 
Balanced Scorecard methodology in 2006 as a management tool for implementing the 
Strategy Management System (SMS).  Taking a cue from other private and public sector 
companies and agencies, the FBI sought to align day-to-day operations with broader 
strategies, generate feedback, and measure progress toward achieving long term goals.3   
This research analyzes what processes are necessary to initiate and sustain 
organizational change and identify and overcome obstacles that impede the process.  
Both external and internal surveys and studies were researched to identify areas where 
change is needed within the JTTF program. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to 
examine FBI strategies, procedures, processes, and organizational structure post 9/11.  
External reviews and studies from Congressional commissions, the National Academy of 
Public Administration (NAPA), DOJ IOG, GAO, and others identified deficiencies and 
made recommendations for improvement.  Reviews by NAPA and DOJ OIG, and an 
internal survey by the FBI counterterrorism division, were particularly applicable to this 
research in as much as they examined investigative tools, core processes, capabilities, and 
other essential functions that directly impact the JTTF. These studies recommended 
                                                 
3 Remarks prepared for delivery by Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
for the FBI Organizational Changes Press Conference, held July 26, 2006 in Washington, D. C. 
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transformational change within the FBI and cited embedded organizational and cultural 
impediments that would hinder change.  Research also identified structural obstacles that 
might inhibit JTTF participation, collaboration, and information sharing.  
In a broader context, this research explored strategic change and transformation in 
large organizations with entrenched bureaucratic cultures, evaluated the psychological 
and organizational factors necessary to initiate and sustain transformational strategic 
change, and identified barriers than impede optimal performance and participation. 
Included were studies of organizations that have successful programs in place to harvest 
best practices and lessons learned from both internal and external sources.   Organizations 
that have used the Balanced Scorecard methodology to implement strategic change were 
also analyzed. Literature and case studies revealed that strategic change in large 
organizations is a complex process which often fails.  In bureaucratic cultures, especially 
government organizations like the FBI, existing processes are often entrenched and 
employees are resistant to change and innovation. Initiating change and institutionalizing 
innovation can be especially complicated in a multi-agency context such as the JTTF 
program.  
A comprehensive internal survey conducted  by the CTD in 2006 and 2007 
specifically addressed eight core JTTF functions and tools, and identified inconsistencies 
and areas in need of improvement. The CTD survey was of particular relevance in as 
much as it was based on interviews of over 450 current state, local, and federal JTTF 
participants.  
In addition to the research, literature review, and surveys identified above, the 
author's personal experience as an FBI agent for the past twenty-three years also 
contributed to this thesis. During the last four years the author has served as a 
counterterrorism supervisor and the JTTF coordinator of the Chicago Field Division 
JTTF.  Personal experience gained through supervising divergent personnel resources 
from multiple state, local, and federal agencies has been invaluable.  Moreover, duties 
that include managing and allocating JTTF resources, budgetary matters, liaison, 
information sharing, and responsibilities concerning the organization and administration 
of the JTTF Executive Board have also afforded a unique perspective. This personal 
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involvement in the JTTF Program, both locally and nationally, has provided insight 
concerning impediments and deficiencies, as well as opportunities for implementing 
innovative programs and initiatives that promote core task force functions and 
capabilities by extending participation and involvement in counterterrorism matters to 
state and local law enforcement not represented on the JTTF. 
In the fall of 2006, the author was selected by CTD Executive Management for 
special assignment to collaborate with Cassandrah Cochran PHD at the NJTTF. Cochran 
is the principal investigator and architect of the JTTF telephone survey.  The author’s 
selection was based on his experience as a counterterrorism supervisor and JTTF 
coordinator in a major FBI Field Office. He contributed to the research portion of the 
project by contacting and interviewing approximately thirty task force members. His 
primary contribution was to collaborate with principal investigator Cochran to formulate 
recommendations for CTD Executive Management to rectify deficiencies identified in the 
survey.  The author relied on field experience as the JTTF Coordinator, formal education 
(at the Naval Postgraduate School), and input from NJTTF and local task force personnel 
in formulating recommendations that would be practical and applicable to local JTTFs. 
Based on analysis and review of literature, external surveys, and studies, and the 
results of the JTTF Telephone Survey, this thesis proposes recommendations to address 
deficiencies within the JTTF Program.  Recommendations focus on the following areas: 
(1) role definitions for JTTF members, (2) revision of the master JTTF field membership 
listing, (3) substantive training and database training, (4) a mentoring/Field Training 
Agent program for TFOs, (5) Lessons Learned/Best Practices program, (6) implementing 
systems to ensure oversight and accountability, (7) source development and training, and 
(8) future surveys of the JTTF Program/Evaluation of JTTF Program changes.  Please 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 9
II. BACKGROUND ON CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR 
Research in this chapter examines efforts by the FBI to transform itself 
subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  This includes critical analysis of strategic 
initiatives undertaken by the FBI and JTTF to develop core competencies and skills 
necessary to deal with emergent threats.  The review includes external studies that 
evaluate FBI policies, procedures, and programs.  Deficiencies, gaps, and areas in need of 
development are identified and specific recommendations for improvement are 
suggested.  
To analyze effectiveness and success in facilitating interagency collaboration, this 
chapter looks at the steps taken by organizations that have successfully navigated 
strategic change to become more competitive. Useful information and valuable lessons 
were gleaned from both public and private organizations that have used innovative 
practices to successfully navigate strategic change. Key drivers necessary to initiate and 
sustain change are evaluated and obstacles that inhibit the transformation process are 
identified, as are the psychological and structural mechanisms needed to initiate the 
transformation process. 
In addition to exploring strategies and processes for initiating change in an 
organizational context, the research focuses on integrating these strategies and processes 
into the Balanced Scorecard framework. In 2006 the FBI implemented the Strategy 
Management System (SMS) in the CTD.  To facilitate this process, the FBI sought to 
emulate the Balanced Scorecard methodology which has been successfully used by a 
number of companies and organizations to cultivate innovation and align core processes 
with primary objectives.  This chapter seeks to identify and analyze specific actions and 
best practices necessary to prepare, execute, and support strategic change and innovation.   
An analysis of the collaborative process in a multidisciplinary context identifies 
key elements necessary to foster collaboration and practices that sustain cooperation. 
Leadership, coalition building, and the cultivation of new ideas and innovative practices 
also play an essential role in organizational transformation and strategic change. 
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Implementing mechanisms that identify and capture best practices and lessons learned 
from both internal and external sources is also important and can be used by the FBI and 
JTTF to successfully navigate the transformation process.       
A.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS 
Reorganization and strategic change in the way the FBI handled counterterrorism 
and intelligence investigations was well under way prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  In 
May of 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh identified national and economic security as the 
FBI’s top priority and the prevention, disruption, and defeat of terrorist operations as the 
primary objective.4  These goals were articulated in the 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, which 
included the reorganization of the Counterterrorism Division and the creation of the 
Investigative Service Division. 
A shift and/or transformation concerning the FBI strategic focus was promulgated 
by FBI Director Robert Mueller immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This 
transformation was driven by a detailed strategic plan to establish objectives and 
priorities that align with the organization’s mission.5  The need to shift strategic focus 
was reinforced in the FBI’s 2004-2009 Strategic Plan.6  In 2003, FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, in testimony before the House of Representatives, conceded that GAO and 
NAPA criticisms concerning FBI efforts to transform were fair. Specifically, Director 
Mueller acknowledged that efforts to revamp core processes, including strategic 
planning, human resources, technology management, and performance metrics, needed to 
be strengthened.7  
                                                 
4 “Statement for the Record, Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation,” Congressional 
Statement, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 24 March 1999 http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress 
1999/freeh324.htm (August 15, 2007)  
5 Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the FBI transformation in strategic focus and reorganization  
included the following elements: (1) refocusing FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning the FBI 
workforce to address these priorities; (3) shifting FBI management and operational environment to enhance 
flexibility, agility, effectiveness, and accountability; (4) restructuring FBI headquarters; and (5) 
reengineering internal business practices and processes. 
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2004-2009 Strategic Plan. 
7 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives,  Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation;  Testimony before the committee on appropriations subcommittee on the Department of 
Commerce, justice, and state, the judiciary and related agencies, 108th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2003. 
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Prospective FBI transformation efforts have been driven by a detailed strategic 
plan that recognizes the importance of human resource recruitment, counterterrorism 
training, and needed improvements concerning information technology. To be successful 
in counterterrorism and intelligence efforts the FBI, and consequently local JTTFs, would 
need to develop a skilled workforce capable of meeting transformational needs.8    
To facilitate strategic change, the FBI hired NAPA in 2005 to evaluate 
transformation efforts. Consistent with 9/11 Commission findings, the NAPA study 
recognized that the FBI would increasingly need to rely on extensive joint operations 
with other federal, state, and local law enforcement entities through task forces such as 
the local JTTFs.9 NAPA assessed the FBI counterterrorism strategy and recommended 
the FBI increase emphasis on human resource planning through recruitment, training, and 
development of requisite capabilities and skills. This process would require FBI 
executive management to focus on long-term, multi-year planning, and the strategic 
management of personnel resources, rather than relying on incremental decision-making.  
To accomplish this transformation process, NAPA recommended FBI personnel receive 
training to facilitate goals and adopt a performance-driven management system.10                                
A formal evaluation of the JTTF program was conducted in 2005 by the DOJ 
OIG. The review was conducted in light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, in as much 
as the DOJ had shifted significant resources in a concerted effort to redefine the 
department’s mission, objectives, and priorities to address the top priority: 
counterterrorism.11 The review sought to evaluate the performance of existing terrorism 
task forces (that had expanded rapidly in response to the 9/11 attacks) and the creation of 
new task forces to include the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Anti- Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC).             
                                                 
8 National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA),  Transforming the FBI: Progress and 
Challenges, (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Public Administration, January 2005), 20 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2004). 
10  NAPA, Transforming the FBI, 22. 
11 NAPA, Transforming the FBI, i. 
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The OIG evaluated various DOJ terrorism task forces against strategic goals, 
including the prevention of terrorism and the promotion of national security. The JTTF 
and NJTTF were among the task forces reviewed.12 The OIG sought to determine 
whether task force functions were duplicative or overlapped and examined the adequacy 
of task force guidance and oversight, to include the availability and/or use of meaningful 
performance metrics. OIG methodology consisted of document reviews, interviews, field 
office visits, a web-based survey, and other observations.13  
The OIG identified a number of positive attributes concerning local JTTFs and the 
NJTTF. The OIG survey determined that the JTTF and the NJTTF had improved 
information sharing, collaborative partnerships, and investigative capabilities in 
conjunction with DOJ counterterrorism efforts. The study concluded the various task 
forces and councils were not duplicative, had separate functions, and relationships with 
other federal, state, and local agencies and private entities had improved.  By expanding 
law enforcement community members with security clearances, the GAO found 
participation broadened and information sharing opportunities enhanced.14 The expansion 
of the JTTF, to include a larger segment of state, local, and federal participants, provided 
a “force multiplier” by expanding participation, skills, and experience to support DOJ 
counterterrorism efforts.15 
The OIG also identified a number of deficiencies in the system and made 
recommendations for improvement. Audit results suggested many TFOs had no previous 
counterterrorism experience prior to placement on the JTTF and the FBI lacked a uniform 
national training plan. In addition to a lack of experience, the DOJ survey determined the 
majority of new task force personnel had no prior domestic or international terrorism 
                                                 
12 The Deputy Attorney General’s National Security Coordination Council (NSCC), U.S 
Attorneys’Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC), and the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 
Force (FTTF) were also reviewed. 
13 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspection Division, The 
Department of Justice’s Task Forces, I-2005-007 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 
2005), i. 
14 Ibid., 32. 
15 Ibid., ii.  
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training or education. Once assigned to a local JTTF and/or the NJTTF, a significant 
number of TFOs still had not received basic counterterrorism training.  Of more concern 
was the fact that many of these TFOs went untrained for months, and in some 
circumstances years, after assignment.  The survey determined the median time JTTF 
personnel went without receiving training was 390 days.16  This is inconsistent with FBI 
Director Mueller's statement that, by the end of 2003, basic counterterrorism training 
would be provided to every JTTF member.17   
The OIG found that, in light of the prolific growth of the JTTFs and the lack of 
experience and counterterrorism training on the part of new members, standardized 
training and a well-defined training plan were essential.18  The survey determined that 
existing JTTF training was in most cases determined locally by the respective FBI Field 
Offices and as such was oftentimes inconsistent and inequitable.  For example, some FBI 
Field Offices offered web-based multimedia instruction concerning international and 
domestic terrorism matters, while other field offices sent task force members to basic 
counterterrorism courses at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.  Likewise, a number 
of field divisions proactively developed training and education programs that addressed 
cultural sensitivity, terrorism financing, and terrorism investigative strategies, while other 
field divisions failed to develop or implement any kind of independent training 
agendas.19  
A significant number of state, local, and non-FBI TFOs interviewed by the OIG 
complained about the absence of formal procedures and lack of notification regarding 
training opportunities. Many task force participants were generally unaware of available 
training programs.  Task force personnel also complained that FBI agents assigned to the 
JTTF were given preference concerning training opportunities.20 The OIG determined 
                                                 
16 The Department of Justice’s Task Forces, I-2005-007  69. 
17 Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program 
Since 2001, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 14, 2004). 
18 DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, The Department of Justice’s Task Forces, 64. 
19 Ibid., 65. 
20 DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, The Department of Justice’s Task Forces, iv. 
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that lack of training notification and perceived training inequities might cause resentment, 
impact work productivity, and undermine collaboration in the task force setting.21 
The OIG also concluded the FBI had no structured, system wide program in place 
to orient new task force members. The OIG considered orientation important in as much 
as 55 percent of the approximately 5,085 task force members assigned to the JTTF were 
from outside the FBI. The survey found that 40 percent of both FBI and non-FBI task 
force members assigned to the JTTF and NJTTF had not received program orientation.  
Those who did receive orientation claimed it was provided primarily through on-the-job 
training and advice from other task force members, rather than through a formal 
orientation program.  It was likewise determined that when orientation was provided, it 
was – at best – inconsistent, sporadic, and varied widely amongst the local JTTFs.22  
Because most of the non-FBI task force personnel were from traditional law-
enforcement backgrounds, the GAO recommended the FBI provide orientation and 
training concerning terrorism investigations, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and 
human source (HUMINT) development.23  The OIG concluded that state, local, and other 
federal law-enforcement members would benefit from timely, relevant, and 
comprehensive orientation that encompassed FBI policies and procedures.24 
The OIG also concluded the FBI had not adequately defined, in writing, the 
mission, roles, and responsibilities of the respective JTTF participants.  Moreover, as of 
2005, the JTTF was not adequately utilizing resources to interact and share information 
with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote areas. The study also found 
the FBI had not developed outcome-oriented performance measures for the JTTF as an 
entity or for individual participants. Likewise, the JTTF and NJTTF had not developed 
sufficient criteria to assess strategies, operations and resources.25 
                                                 
21 DOJ OIG, Evaluation and Inspection Division, The Department of Justice’s Task Forces, 74. 
22 Ibid., iv.  
23 Ibid., 76. 
24 Ibid., 82. 
25 Ibid, 65-84.  
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Pursuant to the survey, the OIG report provided three primary recommendations 
to improve the efficiency and operations of the counterterrorism task forces. First, the 
OIG determined the FBI should develop and implement a national training plan for the 
JTTF. In order to ensure optimal efficacy the OIG suggested the FBI conduct an initial 
needs assessment and thereafter tailor curriculum to meet those needs. It also 
recommended the FBI assign responsibility for developing and managing the program, 
establishing minimum mandatory training standards and time frames for completion. As 
part of the process, task force participants would be required to complete introductory 
training within ninety days of joining the task force and would complete designated 
minimum training hours annually. Responsibility for training notification would be 
assigned to the field, with the objective of targeting and eliminating training inequities for 
FBI and non-FBI task force members. 
Secondly, the OIG recommended the FBI develop a formal, standardized 
orientation program for all new JTTF and NJTTF members and provide the orientation 
within thirty days of assignment. Finally, the OIG advised the FBI to develop 
performance measures for their Counterterrorism Task Force. 
B.   RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC CHANGE 
Due to the rapid growth and increase in responsibilities of the JTTF, the 
consistency and effectiveness of the local JTTF offices varies nationwide.  To increase 
effectiveness and facilitate interagency collaboration, the JTTF can apply steps taken by 
business organizations that have successfully navigated strategic change to become more 
competitive. Although change for the sake of change does not ensure improvement, by 
identifying the areas of weakness that hinder the process, change can be implemented to 
eliminate obstacles and promote uniformity.   
Transformational initiatives that facilitate change in large organizations are often 
difficult. Factors that impede transformation can be both psychological and structural.  To 
be successful, a transformation program must have vision and an implementation strategy 
that recognizes and overcomes embedded organizational and psychological impediments 
that favor the status quo. First, employees may fear proposed changes will worsen the 
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situation.  This fear stems from the comfort and perception of competence that develops 
from the repetitive performance of job tasks.  Second, in bureaucratic organizations such 
as the federal government, consistency is valued and employees need systemic and 
sustained reassurance that management is committed to the prospective change.  Third, a 
sense of commitment to the current course of action and/or strategy is established through 
sustained exposure over time. Finally, behavior can become culturally embedded in the 
organization, creating the false impression that the current course of action is preferable 
over change.26 
Bureaucratic organizations, by their very nature, promote resistance to change by 
developing structures, training, culture, and incentives to induce employees to conform to 
organizational mandates.  Adaptability and innovation are often viewed as disruptive to 
the existing political hierarchy and balance of power. Innovation and the generation of 
new ideas are restrained by standard operating procedures, rules, hierarchy, and 
specialization, all of which limit employee experiences and flexibility.  This type of 
organization, and government in particular, is often more adept at punishing errors than 
rewarding excellence. The tendency to punish failure discourages risk-taking behavior 
that may result in failure.27 Because bureaucratic goals and objectives are often divergent 
and vague, accurate performance metrics to gauge success are lacking. The absence of 
clear performance metrics can diminish accountability and responsibility, which in turn 
encourages adherence to existing rules and procedures. Because change is associated with 
risk and failures are magnified, employees have few incentives to champion innovative 
initiatives.28 
Change in a large bureaucracy is often easier when it involves incremental 
changes and innovative approaches that modify or improve existing practices.29 Based on 
the premise that people are resistant to change, the literature advocates two primary 
                                                 
26 Steven Kelman, Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 24-25. 
27 Ibid., 29. 
28 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 30. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
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organizational strategies to initiate and convince employees they should embrace new 
behaviors and ideas.  These involve a campaign of “shock and awe” that focuses on 
extreme measures to induce employee cooperation, coupled with a series of penalties 
and/or rewards.  Both of these approaches operate under the premise that employees are 
inherently resistant to change.30 These strategies ignore important demographic, 
hierarchical, and psychological factors that can be used to create an atmosphere 
conducive to organizational change. In large organizations, particularly bureaucratic 
organizations such as the government, change is often a political process which is 
initiated by executive leadership.  This process can provide opportunity for those in 
middle management and among the rank-and file to demonstrate leadership qualities. 
To initiate organizational change it is necessary to identify and enlist the support 
of key individuals who are either discontented with the status quo or are predisposed to 
innovation and new ideas.  These individuals can cooperate and form a core constituency 
to unleash change by communicating and promoting transformational ideas and 
programs.  Initially, these individuals will most likely constitute a small minority but, if 
cultivated, can serve a critical role in helping to set in motion the processes necessary to 
implement transformational initiatives. 
Initially, personal commitment and relentless pressure from top leaders is a 
critical driver of the transformation process.31 Therefore, it is incumbent on senior 
leadership to create a sense of urgency in the organization to facilitate change. After 
identifying potential deficiencies in core organizational functions, senior leaders must 
find ways to communicate information concerning the need for change and promote 
transformational initiatives. Without this leadership support on multiple levels, along 
with a communication of current deficiencies, a sense of urgency will not be produced 
and the change process will lose momentum and perish.32 
                                                 
30 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 6. 
31 Michael Hammer and Steven A. Stanton, The Reengineering Revolution (New York: Harper 
Business, 1995), 34. 
32John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformational Efforts Fail (Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
Business School Publishing Corp, 2006), 2-4. 
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During the transformation process, employees fall into four broad groups: the 
change vanguard, early recruits, fence-sitters, and skeptics or critics.33 The first group, 
the change vanguard, is comprised of senior leadership.  Literature suggests that leaders 
who embody the change vanguard are motivated by trust and idealism, are ideologically 
inspired, and are discontent with the existing system.34 To effect significant 
transformation, it is important for the coalition to include key individuals who are not 
part of the senior management team but have good reputations and have established a 
level of trust within the organization.  These individuals are the initial recruits who often 
share a desire for job autonomy and a sense of empowerment.35  They are not necessarily 
content with the existing system and are predisposed to enjoy change. Common 
personality characteristics include the ability to think in the abstract, which leads to 
innovative ideas. These individuals are also efficacious, value new experiences, and 
believe that they are in control.36 Other psychological and personal attributes of this 
group include a desire for autonomy, a higher education level, and a sense of 
venturesome-ness. These traits make it easier for them to envision innovative alternatives 
to those organizational systems currently in place.37 Fence-sitters and skeptics are 
characterized by a strong psychological aversion to change.38 
Other potential pools for coalition recruits include individuals who derive 
satisfaction from countering conventional opinion and employees who are experiencing 
high levels of job stress and so can be convinced that autonomy and change might lessen 
their job burdens.39 It is also advantageous to recruit the support of opinion leaders.  
Opinion leaders can exert a robust influence over the attitudes and behaviors of work-
                                                 
33 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 42. 
34 Ibid., 65. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
36 Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovation, 4th Ed. (New York: Free Press, 1995), Chapter 8. 
37 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 74. 
38 Ibid., 70. 
39 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 69. 
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group peers, generating support for change throughout the organizational hierarchy.40 
Without the recruitment of these individuals, it is unlikely that transformational change 
can be accomplished. 
Once a solid guiding coalition is in place, it is essential to develop a strategic 
vision of the future that is easy to communicate and understand.  Without a cohesive 
vision and/or strategy, transformational efforts can become entangled in confusing and 
ineffective projects that are not focused on the core objectives. Symbolic actions and 
straight forward communication conduits can often be used by organizational leaders to 
communicate vision and focus attention on transformation processes.41 Complicated 
plans and directives not easily incorporated into the primary strategy and/or vision will 
confuse and may alienate employees.  It has been suggested that if understanding and 
interest in the organizational vision cannot be effectively communicated by leaders in 
five minutes or less, the transformational process will encounter significant difficulties.42 
Another common error in the transformation process is underestimating the need 
for pervasive and sustained communication throughout the organization. Without 
sustained communication efforts, support for the transformational vision will wane and 
cynicism concerning the efficacy of the program will grow. Transformation often 
requires that employees make short-term sacrifices to enable change. Multi-channel 
communication through words and behavior on the part of senior executives and 
coalition-team employees will help convert fence-sitters and silence cynics.43 
Once the change process has been implemented, momentum must be sustained.  
In large organizations, the change process may last several years. To accomplish the 
required tasks, senior executives and line managers must establish goals and clear 
performance metrics to track improvements, reflect objectives, and reward employees.  
                                                 
40 Rogers, Difussion of Innovation, 273. 
41 Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Management as a Symbolic Action” in Research in Organizational Behavior, 
Volume 3, edited by L.L Cummings and Barry M. Staw (Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1981), 1-52. 
42Kelman, Unleashing Change, 8-9. 
43 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 10. 
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Formulating short-term achievable goals – or “wins” – creates an atmosphere whereby 
psychological and operational change can gain momentum and feed on itself. Early 
achievements and positive experiences provide a mechanism for leaders to communicate 
positive feedback.  Positive feedback is defined as a process whereby “the change in one 
direction sets in motion reinforcing pressures that produce further change in the same 
direction.”44 Studies of government procurement reform determined that positive initial 
experiences have a strong correlation to sustained support for change.45 This 
phenomenon is called “tipping point contagion and path dependence.”46 Theories suggest 
change typically starts slowly and then reaches a critical mass or tipping point whereby 
new practices spread throughout the organization and becomes self-reinforcing.  This 
process is dependent on a number of drivers including the creation of early goals and/or 
wins, successful experiences, and positive feedback. Creating short-term goals and 
benchmarks also promotes the analytic thinking necessary to clarify or even revise the 
organizational vision to foster a continued sense of urgency in the transformation 
process.47  Once these processes are in place, expectations that shape employee behavior 
become self-fulfilling prophecies and subsequent behaviors fulfill initial predictions of 
success.48 
Other psychological processes that have an impact on attitudes towards 
transformation include gradualism, or the iterative introduction of processes that lead to 
change.  An example of this phenomenon is the “foot in the door” technique that is used 
extensively in the business world by salesmen.  The idea is that if individuals can be 
induced to make small, seemingly inconsequential changes, they will be psychologically 
inclined to subsequently engage in much larger and more consequential actions.49   
                                                 
44 Robert Jervice, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997),125. 
45 Kelman, Unleashing Change, 113. 
46 Ibid., 116. 
47 Kotter, Leading Change, 14. 
48 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), 421-36. 
49 Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives on Social Psychology 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), 50. 
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Socialization and peer support are other potentially powerful determinants of 
organizational change. This is particularly applicable to the influences within an 
employee’s immediate workgroup.  Specifically, peers influence individuals in a group 
setting in three primary ways: through pressure to conform, access to information, and 
through persuasion.50  Peer influence can manifest in a number of ways and can be either 
positive or negative.  Perceptions are important and supporters and/or detractors can have 
a corresponding influence on the level of support in the workgroup.  Leaders also play an 
important role because they are perceived to be in an authoritative position and may 
influence attitudes among those in the group who defer to those in authority.  Sustained 
communication and perceived leadership support for change can negate the notion that 
the change initiative is transient.  This leadership support also makes it more difficult for 
critics to attack change initiatives and can energize individuals in the organization who 
are sympathetic to or support transformational programs.51 
Transformational processes are mechanisms to create feedback and subsequently 
influence attitudes that are self-reinforcing and are primarily driven by influences 
inherent in the workplace. Significant change often takes years to accomplish and until 
innovative processes and changes are embedded into the organizational culture, progress 
and reforms are fragile and subject to regression.52  Ultimately, change in an organization 
must become rooted in the values, culture, and social norms of the organization or it will 
erode and fade with the passage of time and the turnover of key stakeholders and guiding 
coalition members. The institutionalization of change in corporate culture is 
accomplished through proactive measures that illustrate the benefit of new ideas, 
initiatives, and innovation, and their impact on organizational performance.  This process 
involves a conscious decision to ensure adaptive approaches are indoctrinated in and 
                                                 
50 Kelman, Unleasing Change, 127. 
51 Ibid., 92. 
52 Kotter, Leading Change, 15. 
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conveyed to new generations of management.  This strategy can be incorporated into the 
hiring process and in evaluation for promotion and advancement.53 
C. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND STRATEGY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
In 2006, the FBI began using the Balanced Scorecard methodology as a 
management tool and implemented the Strategy Management System (SMS) within the 
Counterterrorism Division. Taking a cue from other private and public sector companies 
and agencies, the FBI sought to align day-to-day operations with broader strategies, 
generate feedback, and measure progress.54 The FBI recognized that successful 
companies and organizations have implemented the Balanced Scorecard methodology for 
strategic planning to increase transparency, improve participation, facilitate accessibility, 
and establish balance.  To achieve operational excellence, high-performance 
organizations apply multiple strategies to cultivate innovative approaches. To be 
successful, local JTTFs must also promote innovative approaches that align with rewards 
and incentives, which in turn will link innovation to performance and participation. The 
JTTF must encourage new ideas, assess their effectiveness, and adopt ideas that are 
useful in achieving organizational goals. Innovative ideas can be used to improve existing 
programs, develop new programs, target limited resources, and create strategic 
collaborative partnerships with other organizations.55   
Although Balanced Scorecard methodology has been adopted by a number of 
private and public organizations, success is impacted by senior executives’ organizational 
commitment. This commitment includes establishing structural elements that promote 
education and strategic learning. To foster and sustain innovation, the JTTF must have 
senior leaders who establish a clear and compelling vision, generate support for that 
                                                 
53 Kotter, Leading Change, 16, 17. 
54 Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
FBI Organizational Changes Press Conference, July 26, 2006 Washington, D. C. 
55 Debra Knopman and Susan A. Resetar, Innovation and Change Management in Public and Private 
Organizations: Case Studies and Options for the EPA (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Science and Technology, 
April 2003), vii. 
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vision, and personally participate in the change process.  To accomplish this, executive 
leadership must create an environment in which creativity and innovation can flourish 
and best practices and lessons learned can be institutionalized.  This process includes 
establishing an organizational culture and management system which support 
innovation.56 
Innovation in the framework of the Balanced Scorecard has been studied in the 
context of both private and in public organizations.  In 2003, at the request of Congress 
and the NAPA, the RAND Corporation studied innovation in both the private and public 
sector. The study was conducted on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which sought to capture characteristics of innovative organizations, identify 
elements of change management that enabled these organizations to innovate, and 
ultimately suggest options for implementing innovation and change within their own 
agency.57 RAND identified structures and processes required to initiate, implement, 
support, and sustain innovation throughout an organization or government agency.  
Innovation was defined as organizational changes in culture, output, and business 
processes that collectively help an organization become more effective in fulfilling its 
core mission. 
As part of the research process RAND selected and studied six innovative public 
and private organizations. RAND analysts then identified systems of change management 
within these organizations, including specific actions necessary to prepare, execute, and 
support innovation.58 Principles and best practices gleaned from the RAND study can be 
used by the FBI and JTTF in the transformation process.       
Pursuant to the study, RAND identified an integrated system of activities that 
categorize primary domains encompassing the Balanced Scorecard approach. The 
primary domains include the following: (1) mission and strategy, (2) employees and 
organizational capacity, (3) business processes, (4) budget and finance, and (5) external 
                                                 
56 Knopman and Resetar, Innovation and Change Management , vii. 
57 Ibid., 1. 
58 Ibid , 3. 
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relationships. In selecting potential candidates to study, RAND identified decentralized 
corporations and organizations that sustained innovative processes over a five-year 
period. Candidates were also organizationally complex, in as much as they exhibited a 
multilayered structure, were engaged in a multifunctional mission, and worked in close 
partnership with both public and private external organizations. Candidates were also 
geographically distributed and had multiple stakeholders with diverse and divergent 
interests. Finally, candidates had an asymmetric risk of success and failure, regulatory-
like functions, and a predictable leadership continuum. The federal agencies selected 
were the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), United States Customs Service (USCS), 
and the Veterans Health Administration (VA).  Companies selected in the private sector 
included Marriott International, du Pont and Procter & Gamble. The aforementioned 
organizations were selected because they all have multiple organizational levels, are 
multifunctional, and – because of size – are beset by some degree of organizational 
inertia .59  
In the initial phase RAND examined the transformation process, including the 
underlying causes of change, factors that made the organization innovative, and specific 
activities utilized in the transformation process. RAND also analyzed common themes 
amongst candidates, including the status of the organization and internal processes used 
to manage change and innovation. Identified innovation drivers were: timelines for 
innovation; related actions; barriers and support to change; human, budgetary and other 
resources utilized; and key enabling actions to promote the change process. Other factors 
examined were evaluation methods and measures, information sharing, and the 
integration of innovation and change into organizational practices, to include staffing, 
training, and budget.60 
Innovative organizations use performance-driven management systems for 
guiding and stimulating innovation. This involves gathering information on preferences, 
interests, and the satisfaction of external parties and stakeholders. These organizations 
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make changes that focus on the organizational mission and permeate all business 
functions. In the first domain benchmarks, performance metrics and evaluation systems 
are put in place to measure the progress and efficacy of new approaches. 
The second domain covers an organizations’ capacity to identify activities and 
processes that ensure proper training and skills development. The quantification of 
organizational capacity is necessary to create a multifunctional problem-solving culture 
that excels at incorporating knowledge from both external and internal sources. This 
domain rewards innovators and cultivates those managers and leaders who are open to 
change. It also assigns accountability to senior management, while providing employees 
the flexibility needed to effectuate change. 
A third domain involves business processes. These processes create ownership 
and accountability that guide change and performance improvement. Implemented 
business processes establish structured procedures for generating ideas, testing those 
ideas, aligning innovation to strategy, and adopting those ideas to contribute to mission 
success. Budget and funding provisions must be in place to provide the foundation for 
furnishing the resources necessary to support innovation at all levels.61 Finally, the 
organization must establish and cultivate collaborative relationships with external 
constituents to provide the organization with the capability to harvest opportunities. 
These opportunities often include lessons learned and best practices from outside sources 
In light of the above, the JTTF must perform three integrated actions to innovate: 
prepare for change, support change, and execute change. All of the aforementioned 
processes must be completed for innovation to be successful. The first step is recognizing 
the need for change and generating leadership support by building a coalition of key 
stakeholders. These key stakeholders must then engage in the process by implementing 
an action plan that establishes benchmarks to monitor progress, developing short- and 
long-term goals, and assigning accountability. Likewise, potential impediments must be 
identified, addressed, and overcome to ensure success.62 
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The second component necessary to sustain innovation is supporting change.  
This process involves maintaining multilateral communication, while providing the 
requisite training to develop the skills necessary to create change and perform new tasks.  
In this phase incentives are provided and personnel are rewarded for innovative action. 
The ability to innovate is tied to rewards in the form of raises, bonuses, recognition, and 
autonomy. Innovative capabilities are manifested through openness to new ideas, 
enhanced problem-solving capacity, and an appreciation for individuals who challenge 
the status quo.  It is likewise necessary for the organization to provide adequate resources 
to generate novel ideas, training, and educational opportunities to develop new skills.63  
Through these actions the organization can create and cultivate a climate for innovation 
consistent with the organization's culture and mission. 
The final step is executing change.  This process involves evaluating progress 
through pilot studies and other means. Pilot studies are an important part of the 
development process that facilitates the incorporation of lessons learned during the 
implementation process.  Execution can be accomplished through leadership teams, 
special planning and budgeting processes, or project review and management programs. 
If a structured execution plan is not implemented, organizational personnel will not have 
a conduit to provide innovative ideas for future development and ultimately the system 
will wither and die.64 
To incorporate change in the context of the SMS, the JTTFs must implement a 
comprehensive framework that will translate the JTTF vision and strategy into a coherent 
and linked set of performance measures. To be effective, these measures should 
incorporate both outcome metrics and performance drivers specifically related to those 
outcomes. By identifying and defining outcomes, and the drivers of those outcomes, the 
organization can channel the energies, abilities, and knowledge inherent in the 
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organization to achieve both short-term and long-term goals. 65 These SMS measures can 
be used in a variety of ways to include aligning individual, organizational, and 
geographical initiatives to achieve a common goal.66  If properly constructed, it is 
hypothesized that the aforementioned components will provide the unity of purpose 
needed to help the organization focus on an integrated strategy.67 
As part of the SMS, FBI JTTF managers and key stakeholders must identify 
critical internal processes that are essential for the organization to excel. These processes 
will have the greatest impact on the organization’s mission and objectives.68  This 
process is fundamentally different than traditional approaches utilized to monitor and 
improve existing organizational processes. Optimally, the Balanced Scorecard 
methodology cultivates the identification and implementation of new and innovative 
processes necessary to excel.  In addition, the organization will direct resources to those 
core processes critical to the organization’s strategy to succeed.  Likewise, the JTTF 
Program must incorporate innovative processes to meet the organization’s existing and 
emerging needs.  This is accomplished through integrating objectives and measures to 
address both short-term and long-term goals.69  
Education, training, learning, and growth represent the foundation for current and 
future JTTF success. This learning and growth emanate from several sources including 
personnel and organizational procedures. The JTTF can use SMS to identify gaps in 
existing capabilities. Subsequently, procedures can be put in place to optimize 
performance. To fill the gaps and accomplish the targeted outcomes, specific skills and 
capabilities must be developed through learning and training to achieve desired results. 
Objectives and measures should be linked and mutually reinforcing in a cause and effect 
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relationship. For example, proper training concerning the use and utility of various FBI 
databases would translate into increased efficiency in conjunction with intelligence 
collection and investigations.  These outcomes can only be achieved through education 
and training that effectively develop – and continually improve – task force personnel 
skills.70  
D.  INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION 
As a multi-agency task force, it is useful for the JTTF to identify organizational 
processes that enhance collaboration and eliminate or minimize barriers. It is also 
necessary to conceptualize and measure processes that are essential components of 
collaborative capacity: the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain 
inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes. Using the data and 
theories of other collaboration scholars and practitioners, Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) researchers Susan Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Thomas constructed an audit to 
measure an organization’s collaborative capacity. The audit identified characteristics that 
contribute to interagency collaborative capacity.71 
The NPS audit determined that effective collaboration incorporates the following 
elements: (1) a common shared vision, (2) a sense of joint responsibility, (3) 
accountability, (4) information sharing, and (5) clear metrics for gauging success. 
Impediments to interagency collaboration include: (1) a lack of information sharing, (2) a 
lack of common missions, (3) unclear roles and responsibilities, (4) mistrust, and (5) 
other factors.72 Collaborative capacity occurs when organizational members develop new 
frames of reference for existing problems and capabilities.73 
As organizations become more dependent on one another, the success of multi-
agency networks, such as the JTTF, become increasingly important in efforts to increase 
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performance and accomplish homeland security prerogatives. Collaboration and 
interagency cooperation is both necessary and imperative. Collaboration is defined by the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) as a joint activity that produces more value than 
can be produced when organizations act alone.74 This complex interagency collaborative 
capacity is characterized by high task uncertainty, multiple participants, virtual 
communication, and diverse organizational goals. The GAO determined that in a multi-
agency context, collaboration can be sustained by adopting the following practices: (1) 
define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint 
strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and 
responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate 
across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on 
results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans 
and reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 
performance management systems.75 
To accomplish its mission, the JTTF must implement these and other 
collaborative processes to leverage dispersed resources, identify and transfer best 
practices, streamline information sharing, cross pollinate innovative ideas, and maximize 
scarce resources.76 Successful collaboration also involves initiatives that integrate and 
collaborate with non-JTTF participants to include, but not be limited to, stakeholders 
representing smaller state and local law enforcement departments, public health, first 
responders, and private industry. 
If the JTTF is to increase collaborative capacity, internal conditions must be 
created whereby driving forces are greater than restraining forces.  Executive leadership 
must be committed to the process and motivated to create a culture where collaboration 
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flourishes.77  Enabling factors include strategic transformation driven by a common goal, 
such as the improvement of information sharing processes and/or the implementation of a 
cohesive training program.  Accomplishing a shared objective involves the willingness to 
adapt the collaborative effort to reflect the organizational needs and interests of 
participating organizations. As an example, for processes such as information sharing and 
communication, the JTTF must implement procedures to ensure pertinent information is 
disseminated in a timely fashion to interagency partners.78 As part of the process on a 
structural level and to fulfill its mission as an interagency task force, the JTTF must be 
internally consistent throughout the program and align objectives with key stakeholder 
participants.79 
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III. CTD SURVEY RESULTS 
A.  METHODOLOGY 
1. Participants 
The present study represents one of the few survey research projects where the 
population was both known and had the potential of being completely identified. The 
population was all Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) members nationwide throughout 
the 102 JTTF locations. Membership was operationally defined as any individual 
assigned to the JTTF, regardless of status (i.e., full-time, part-time, or liaison) or 
membership agency (e.g., federal, state, or local). Survey selectees included both law 
enforcement and JTTF participants who serve an intelligence function.80   
Selections for the study were made using the master JTTF listing database housed 
at the NJTTF, into which the 101 JTTF locations nationwide input their JTTF members.  
At the time the survey began there were 4,589 members in this master listing.  The target 
sample for the study was 10% of all members, or 459.  However, 15% (638) were 
initially contacted to compensate for those members we would be unable to survey for 
whatever reason.  Surveyees were randomly chosen for participation. After completion of 
the first sample, it was determined a second sample was needed to reach our goal of 459 
participants. This brought the total sample to 705.  At the conclusion of the study, data 
was successfully obtained on 447 JJTF members. In addition to overall trends, 
comparisons were made by region of the country, JTTF membership status (i.e., full-time 
vs. part-time), and JTTF agency membership (e.g., FBI vs. non-FBI). 
One month prior to conducting the random selection, each JTTF coordinator was 
contacted and asked to update the membership and contact information. In order to obtain 
complete data on 10% of the population, a 15% random sample selection was utilized.  
For the random sampling procedure, a master list of the 4,589 members was created in a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  It was determined that 15% of the population was equal to 
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689 individuals.  An equation was entered into Excel requesting the program to randomly 
select 689 individuals from the master list. The procedure employed was a true random 
sample, in that weighted selections were not made and it was possible for individuals to 
be chosen more than once. That is, all participants had an equal chance of being selected 
and selection was not influenced by other factors, such as field office size or agency 
membership. The resulting list of 689 individuals was scanned for duplicate selections.   
Once duplicate selections were removed, the final list of participants contained 638 
individuals. 
The final target sample for the present study was 459.  The only inclusion 
criterion was that each individual be a JTTF member in any of the 101 JTTFs nationwide.  
Exclusion criteria consisted of the following: (1) the individual refused to complete the 
survey, (2) the individual was on extended leave or temporary duty assignment (TDY) 
and would not return until after the data collection period, (3) the individual was no 
longer a JTTF member, or (4) attempts to contact the individual during the data collection 
period were unsuccessful. As noted above, efforts were made prior to conducting the 
random selection procedure to minimize the number of individuals on the master list who 
might meet exclusion criteria. Approximately 638 JTTF members were contacted 
regarding the present study. As of March 23, 2006, data had been entered for all 638 
participants, of which 225 produced invalid data due to meeting exclusion criteria. Data 
had been collected on 413 participants, or 8.9% of all JTTF members, which fell forty-six 
short of the initial goal of 459.   
In order for results to be generalizable and valid, it was determined that a second 
random sample was needed to try and obtain survey data on forty-six additional 
individuals. Eighty additional participants were randomly chosen from the same master 
list of 4,589 JTTF members. After duplicate selections were removed, sixty-seven 
additional JTTF members were contacted to complete the survey. This brought our total 
sample to 705 participants.   
When all data had been collected and entered from both samples, valid survey 
data had been obtained on 447 individuals. There were 258 participants that met 
exclusion criteria with four (2%) refusing to complete the survey, seventeen (7%) on 
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extended leave or TDY who could not be contacted, 210 (81%) were no longer JTTF 
members, nineteen (7%) were not successfully contacted, and eight (3%) met exclusion 
criteria for other reasons.  Although we were still twelve surveys short of meeting our 
goal of 459, data was successfully obtained on approximately 9.7% of all JTTF members.  
It should be noted that as a result of the JTTF Telephone Survey, it was discovered that 
member listings for the 101 locations were inaccurate. Some of the individuals contacted 
for the survey indicated they had not been a JTTF member for as long as one year; 
therefore, the actual number of JTTF members is lower than 4,589. Depending on the 
actual total number of JTTF members nationwide, data obtained on the 447 members 
may actually meet or surpass the minimum 10% criteria.   
Of those selected for participation 705, 37% (261) were FBI agents, 30% (213) 
Federal Task Force Officers (TFO), 10% (72) State TFOs, 22% (156) Local TFOs, and 
1% (one) Other.  Approximately 33% (231) were part-time and 67% (474) had full-time 
status.  Approximately 19% (137) were from Region I, 22% (154) were from Region II, 
37% (260) were from Region III, and 22% (154) were from Region IV (See Appendix A 
for the Regional Map).  Of those successfully surveyed (447), 45% (201) were FBI 
agents, 26% (116) federal Task Force Officers (TFO), 9% (42) state TFOs, 19% (87) 
local TFOs, and 1% (one) Other.  In other words, 45% were FBI personnel and 55% non-
FBI personnel.  Approximately 22% (100) were part-time and 78% (347) had full-time 
status.  Approximately 21% (91) were from Region I, 23% (103) were from Region II, 
31% (140) were from Region III, and 25% (113) were from Region IV.  Approximately 
55% of those surveyed were assigned to a field office versus an annex or resident agency.   
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Figure 1.   JTTF members selected for the survey (705) compared to those who 
completed the survey   (447), by agency membership. 
 
On average, participants had 14.45 (8.42) years of law enforcement experience, 
with a range from 0.67 to 45 and a median of 13.63 years of experience.  FBI special 
agents averaged 8.48 years of law enforcement experience, compared to 12.34 years for 
federal TFOs and 14.26 years for state and local TFOs. Approximately 28% (fifty-six) of 
the FBI special agents had other non-FBI law enforcement experience compared to 34% 
(thirty-two) of the federal TFOs. The average amount of time assigned to the JTTF was 
3.48 years. 
2. Procedure 
The principal investigator (PI) served as primary research consultant to 
Counterterrorism (CTD) executive management regarding the development of survey 
questions, although the topic-area content for the survey was developed by CTD 
executive management independent of the PI. The PI provided guidance to CTD 
executive management to ensure questions were posed in a non-leading manner, and that 
answers to questions could be quantified. All questions were presented in some type of 
forced-choice format. The forced-choice format varied amongst yes/no, Likert scale 
ratings, and multiple-choice formats.  For the multiple-choice formats, an “other” option 
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was provided in the event a participant’s response did not fit into the response set 
provided. In addition, CTD executive management mandated that both quantitative and 
qualitative information be collected from participants. Therefore, a comments section was 
provided at the end of each major section of the survey for participants to add to or 
elaborate on positive or negative feedback not addressed by survey questions.  
CTD executive management made the final decisions regarding the inclusion and 
editing of survey questions. Survey questions were selected to determine if the FBI CTD 
provided JTTF members the necessary tools to accomplish their mission. Identified tools 
included substantive training, investigative tools, database access and training, 
participation in FBI counterterrorism investigations, sources, access to support personnel, 
information sharing via briefings provided by FBI field office management to TFO 
agency management, and leadership and management skills. 
Substantive training was divided into four primary areas: international terrorism 
training; domestic terrorism training; weapons of mass destruction training; and Muslim 
Arab culture training. Survey participants were also queried concerning legal training.  
Investigative tools requests for national security letters and whether survey participants 
had participated in preparing a FISA requests. Participants were also surveyed concerning 
access to and training in using primary FBI databases, including the FBI intranet, 
automated case support, the data extraction and extension project, the sensitive 
compartmented information operational network, Guardian, choice point, telephone 
applications, the investigative data warehouse, LEXIS-NEXIS, law enforcement online, 
and JWICS/SIPRINET. 
The survey also asked JTTF members about participation in FBI counterterrorism 
investigations with regards to source development and operation.  Survey participants 
were also questioned concerning leadership and management skills of FBI field office 
managers, information sharing between the office managers, and TFO agency 
management and access to FBI support personnel. 
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Selected survey participants were contacted via telephone by members on the 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for data collection, regardless of 
membership (i.e., FBI or non-FBI).    The survey was conducted via telephone for several 
reasons.  First, it was believed that participants would be more honest due to: (1) the 
direct and more personal form of communication, (2) the potential for developing a 
rapport between the surveyor and surveyee, and (3) the opportunity to capitalize on the 
sense of camaraderie that exists between law enforcement personnel. Second, it was 
thought the NJTTF members conducting the surveys would be more successful at 
obtaining additional information for the comments sections if speaking directly to the 
participant.  That is, there was a concern that participants might be inclined to skip 
questions if asked to complete the survey via email or postal mail.  Finally, it was thought 
the response rate would improve, both in total responses and efficacy, when telephoning 
participants directly, rather than waiting for participants to return the survey via email or 
postal mail. 
3. Data Analysis 
Given this was the first JTTF Telephone Survey conducted, the purpose was to 
gather baseline information and identify problem areas within the JTTF Program.  
Hypotheses were not developed beforehand.  Therefore, all analyses and results are ad-
hoc. Three separate independent variables were used for the comparisons: region of the 
country, JTTF membership status (i.e., full-time vs. part-time), and JTTF agency 
membership (e.g., FBI vs. non-FBI).  The FO divisions were divided into four regions 
(See Appendix A): Region I contained nine FOs (New York, Boston, Albany, Buffalo, 
Newark, New Haven, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore); Region II included seventeen 
FOs (Norfolk, Richmond, San Juan, WFO, Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbia, Knoxville, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit, Memphis, Milwaukee, Springfield, 
and Louisville); Region III had eighteen FOs (Birmingham, Denver, Oklahoma City, St. 
Louis, Dallas, El Paso, Kansas City, San Antonio, Houston, Jackson, Little Rock, New 
Orleans, Jacksonville, Miami, Mobile, Tampa, Minneapolis, and Omaha); and Region IV 
contained twelve FOs (Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, 
San Francisco, Honolulu, Las Vegas, Portland, Anchorage, Los Angeles, and Seattle).   
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The purpose of this research was to gather baseline information regarding 
program evaluation and to determine where additional resources are needed for the 
continued success of the JTTF Program. The consumers of this information are CTD 
executive management at the FBI; therefore, the report is tailored towards their needs and 
level of understanding. This research is not intended to further science, develop new 
theories, or to be published in a scientific journal. Therefore, the results section of this 
report is heavily weighted towards descriptive statistics for ease of comprehension by the 
target audience 
CTD executive management requested that qualitative data be gathered in 
addition to quantitative data. For this reason, a comments section was provided following 
the training, database/systems, and support personnel sections of the survey. A final 
comments section was also placed at the end of the survey. These comments sections 
were completely open-ended, in that participants could add any comments they wished 
regarding the JTTF program or working with the FBI. Comments were organized into 
categories based on recurring themes. Each theme was assigned a number and counts 
were tallied. This procedure was employed for all comments sections throughout the 
survey. 
B. SUPPORT AND TRAINING 
1. Substantive Training 
On average, 79% of JTTF members sampled had received some type of 
counterterrorism training. Specifically, 91% received international terrorism (IT) training, 
81% received domestic terrorism (DT) training, 67% had training in weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and 78% received Muslim-Arab culture (MAC) training.  The most 
popular reason given for those who had not received training was “It was not offered to 
me,” followed by “time constraints,” and “lack of awareness regarding training 
opportunities.”   
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a. International Terrorism Training 
Concerning the 91% of those surveyed who reported receiving IT training, 
80% reported receiving FBIHQ-sponsored IT training, followed by FBI Field Office-






































Figure 2.   International terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for 
"Any IT training" and 409 for “FBIHQ IT training,” “FBI FO IT training,” and 
“non-FBI IT training.” 
 
For FBI HQ-sponsored IT training, 56% rated the training as “average” or 
“above average,” 11% rated it “exceptional,” and 6% rated it “below average” or “poor,” 
with 27% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored IT training, 53% rated the training as 
“average” or “above average,” 16% rated it “exceptional,” and 5% rated it “below 
average” or “poor,” with 24% missing data.  The mean rating was 3.76 (between “good” 
and “above average”) as compared to a mean rating of 3.64 for FBI HQ-sponsored 
training. For non-FBI-sponsored IT training, 52% rated the training as “average” or 
“above average,” 16% rated it “exceptional,” and 3% rated it “below average” or “poor,” 
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Figure 3.   Quality ratings for international terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are 
as follows: 327 for "FBIHQ IT training," 231 for "FBI FO IT training," and 205 
for “non-FBI IT training.” 
 
Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing IT 
training received by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region I were most likely 
to receive IT training at 96%, followed by 95% in Region II, 93% in Region IV, and 85% 
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Figure 4.   IT training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 
103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV. 
 
Analysis also revealed statistically significant differences when comparing 
IT training received by membership status. Specifically, 76% of part-time members 
received IT training, as compared to 96% of full-time members. Survey results revealed 
that JTTF agency membership impacted IT training received. Ninety-six percent of FBI 
agents surveyed received IT training, compared to 86% of federal TFOs, 81% of state 
TFOs, and 95% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs into a non-FBI group yielded a more 
powerful statistical comparison. The non-FBI group was then compared to an FBI group 
(consisting of FBI JTTF members), yielding significant disparities: 96% of FBI Agents 
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Figure 5.   IT training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes 
are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, and 201 for FBI 
members, and 245 for non-FBI members.  
 
b. Domestic Terrorism Training 
Overall, 81% of those surveyed reported receiving DT training.  Of those 
who reported receiving DT training, 82% reported receiving FBI HQ-sponsored DT 
training, followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored DT training at 33% and non-FBI-





































Figure 6.   Domestic terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for 
"Any DT training" and 364 for “FBIHQ DT training,” “FBI FO DT training,” and 
“non-FBI DT training.” 
 
For FBI HQ-sponsored DT training, 53% respondents rated the training as 
“average” or “above average,” 12% rated it “exceptional,” and 7% rated it “below 
average” or “poor,” with 28% missing data. For FBI FO-sponsored DT training, 53% 
rated the training as “average” or “above average,” 14% rated it “exceptional,” and 3% 
rated it “below average” or “poor,” with 29% missing data.  The mean rating was 3.67 as 
compared with a mean rating of 3.54 for FBIHQ-sponsored training.  For non-FBI-
sponsored DT training, 50% rated the training as “average” or “above average,” 10% 
rated it “exceptional,” and 2% rated it “below average” or “poor,” with 38% missing 
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Figure 7.   Quality ratings for domestic terrorism training received.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 296 for "FBIHQ DT training," 119 for "FBI FO DT training," and 108 
for “non-FBI DT training.” 
 
When comparing regions of the country, 86% of those surveyed from 
Regions I and II received DT training, compared to 78% in Regions II and III.  Analysis 
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Figure 8.   T training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 91 for Region I, 
103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.  
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Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing 
domestic terrorism training received by membership status. Approximately 73% of part-
time members received DT training, compared to 84% of full-time members. JTTF 
agency membership played a factor concerning DT training received; 84% of FBI agents 
received DT training, compared to 73% of federal TFOs, 79% of state TFOs, and 86% of 
local TFOs.  When comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF regarding DT 
training, 85% of FBI agents on the JTTF received training, compared to 78% of non-FBI 
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Figure 9.   DT training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes 
are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, 
and 245 for non-FBI members. 
 
c.  Weapons of Mass Destruction Training 
Overall, 67% of JTTF members reported receiving WMD training. Of 
these, the highest number (55%) reported receiving FBI HQ-sponsored WMD training, 
followed by FBI Field Office-sponsored WMD training at 35% and non-FBI-sponsored 





































Figure 10.   Weapons of mass destruction training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 
447 for "Any WMD training," and 301 for “FBIHQ WMD training,” “FBI FO 
WMD training” and “non-FBI WMD training”. 
 
For FBI HQ-sponsored WMD training, 48% rated the training as 
“average” or “above average,” 24% rated it “exceptional,” and 3% rated it “below 
average” or “poor,” with 24% missing data.   For FBI FO-sponsored WMD training, 55% 
rated the training as “average” or “above average,” 19%  rated it “exceptional,” and no 
ratings of “below average” or “poor” were given (with 26% missing data).  The mean 
rating was 3.90, as compared with a mean rating of 4.01 for FBI HQ-sponsored training. 
For non-FBI sponsored WMD training, 45% rated the training as “average” or “above 
average,” 18% rated it “exceptional,” and no ratings of “below average” or “poor” were 
given, with 37% missing data. The mean rating for non-FBI-sponsored WMD training 
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Figure 11.   Quality ratings for weapons of mass destruction training received.  Sample 
sizes are as follows: 164 for "FBI HQ WMD training," 105 for "FBI FO WMD 
training," and 147 for “non-FBI WMD training.” 
 
When comparing regions of the country, 67% of those surveyed from 
Regions I and III received WMD training, compared to 72% in Region II and 63% in 
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Figure 12.   Figure 12 WMD training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows:  
ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region 
IV.  
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When comparing JTTF membership status, 63% of part-time members 
received training compared to 68% of full-time members. Analysis failed to yield 
significant differences regarding WMD training and JTTF membership status. When 
comparing JTTF agency membership, 64% of FBI agents received WMD training, 
compared to 62% of federal TFOs, 74% of state TFOs, and 79% of local TFOs.  When 
comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF regarding WMD training, 64% of FBI 
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Figure 13.   WMD training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample 
sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI 
members, and 245 for non-FBI members.  
 
d. Muslim-Arab Culture Training 
Overall, 78% of survey participants reported receiving MAC training, with 
52% receiving FBI HQ-sponsored MAC training, followed by FBI Field Office-







































Figure 14.   Muslim-Arab culture training received.  Sample sizes are as follows: 447 for 
"Any MAC training" and 348 for “FBI HQ MAC training,” “FBI FO MAC 
training,” and “non-FBI MAC training.” 
 
For FBI HQ-sponsored MAC training, 47% rated the training as “average” 
or “above average,” 26% rated it “exceptional,” and 4% rated it “below average” or 
“poor,” with 23% missing data.  For FBI FO-sponsored MAC training, 48% rated the 
training as “average” or “above average,” 26% rated it “exceptional,” and 3% rated it 
“below average” or “poor,” with 23% missing data.  The mean rating was 3.98 as 
compared with 4.04 for FBI HQ-sponsored training. For non-FBI-sponsored MAC 
training, 40% rated the training as “average” or “above average,” 26% rated it 
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Figure 15.   Figure 15 Quality ratings for Muslim-Arab culture training received.  Sample 
sizes are as follows: 179 for "FBI HQ MAC training," 210 for "FBI FO MAC 
training," and 136 for “non-FBI MAC training.” 
 
 When comparing regions of the country, 86% of those surveyed from 
Region I received MAC training, compared to 78% in Region II, 70% in Region III, and 
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Figure 16.   Figure 16 MAC training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: 
ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region 
IV. 
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Analysis revealed statistically significant differences in Muslim-Arab 
culture training received when measured by JTTF membership status.  Specifically, 58% 
of part-time members received MAC training, compared to 84% of full-time members. 
When comparing JTTF agency membership, 83% of FBI agents received MAC training, 
compared to 69% of federal TFOs, 79% of state TFOs, and 78% of local TFOs.  When 
comparing FBI to non-FBI personnel on the JTTF, 83% of FBI agents on the JTTF 
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Figure 17.   Figure 17: MAC training received by JTTF status and agency membership.  
Sample sizes are as follows:  100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for 
FBI members, and 245 for non-FBI members.  
 
e.  Legal Training 
Regarding other types of training, 70% of JTTF members surveyed 
reported they have received legal training.  Analysis revealed statistically significant 
differences when comparing legal training received by region: at 87%, JTTF participants 
in Region I were most likely to receive legal training, followed by 83% in Region II, 69% 
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Figure 18.   Legal training received by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for 
Region I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.  
 
Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing 
legal training received by membership status. Specifically, 29% of part-time members 
received legal training, compared to 82% of full-time members. When comparing JTTF 
agency membership, 93% of FBI agents received legal training, compared to 44% of 
federal TFOs, 50% of state TFOs, and 63% of local TFOs.  Grouping the TFOs into a 
single non-FBI group yielded a more powerful statistical comparison: ninety-three 






















PT Members FT Members FBI Members Non-FBI Members






Figure 19.   Legal training by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 100 for PT members, 347 for FT members, 201 for FBI members, and 
245 for non-FBI members. 
 
f. Training Comments by JTTF Members 
A comments section was placed at the end of the training portion of the 
survey, allowing participants to freely express any comments they had related to training.  
A total of 173 comments were made. Regardless of the type of training, 29% of all 
comments suggested that additional training is needed. Table 1 (below) lists the most 










Training has been good/improved over the years 22 
More training is needed overall 19 
More Muslim-Arab Culture/Arabic training is needed 10 
Training needs to be more available 8 
Virtual Academy training is poor 7 
Exercise-based/hands-on training is needed 7 
Computer-based training is not sufficient 7 
Quantico training is too tough to get into or travel to 7 
Need more formal classroom training 6 
Need to increase travel funds for training 6 
Training needs to be improved 5 
More advanced, topic-specific training is needed 5 
Need more DT training 5 
Training has been poor 4 
Regional training is needed 4 
Need more WMD training 3 
TFOs need access to Virtual Academy 3 
Need more FISA training 2 
Other 43 
TOTAL 173 
Table 1.   Training comments. 
 
2. Investigative Tools 
a. National Security Letters 
Regarding investigative tools, approximately 50% of JTTF members 
surveyed stated they have requested a National Security Letter (NSL) analysis revealed 
statistically significant differences when comparing how many JTTF members have 
requested NSLs by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region II were most likely 
to have requested a NSL at 61%, followed by 54% in Region I, 52% in Region IV, and 

























Region I Region II Region III Region IV






Figure 20.   NSL requests by region.  Sample sizes are as follows:  ninety-one for Region 
I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.  
 
Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing 
NSL requests by membership status. Specifically, 18% of part-time members have 
requested a NSL compared to 59% of full-time members. 
When comparing JTTF agency membership of those surveyed to how 
many JTTF members have requested NSLs, 74% of FBI Agents have requested a NSL 
compared to 23% of federal TFOs, 38% of state TFOs, and 37% of local TFOs. Grouping 
the TFOs into a single non-FBI group increased yielded a more powerful statistical 
comparison. Specifically, 74% of FBI agents on the JTTF have requested NSLs, 
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Figure 21.   NSL requests by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 
245 for non-FBI members. 
 
b.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Requests 
Regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 29% of JTTF 
members surveyed reported they have prepared a FISA package.  When comparing 
regions of the country, 37% of those surveyed from Region II have prepared a FISA 
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Figure 22.   FISA requests by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region 
I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.  
 
Analysis revealed statistically significant differences when comparing the 
number of JTTF members who have prepared a FISA package by membership status. 
Nine percent of part-time members have prepared a FISA package, compared to 35% of 
full-time members. When comparing JTTF agency membership of those surveyed to how 
many JTTF members have prepared a FISA package, 51% of FBI agents have prepared a 
FISA package, compared to 12% of federal TFOs, 5% of state TFOs, and 15% of local 
TFOs. Combining the TFOs into a single non-FBI group yields a more powerful 
statistical comparison: fifty-one percent of FBI agents on the JTTF have prepared a FISA 
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Figure 23.   FISA requests by JTTF status and agency membership.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 100 for PT members and 347 for FT members; 201 for FBI members and 
245 for non-FBI members. 
 
3.  Database Access and Training 
a.  Database Access 
With regard to database access, 88% of JTTF members had access to the 
Internet, 85% could access the FBI Intranet, and 80% had access to Automated Case 
Support (ACS).  Those accesses least available to or least utilized by JTTF members 
included the Data Extraction and Extension Project (DEEP), with 21% having access; 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION) also at 21%; and 
access to the SIPRNET or JWICS at 28%.  At least half of those surveyed reported 
having access to Guardian (66%), Choice Point (65%), Telephone Applications (62%), 
Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) at 60%, Lexis-Nexis (58%), and Law Enforcement 
Online (LEO) at 56%. The relatively low access to IDW and Guardian is disturbing, 
given that these databases do not require a Top Secret operating system. Guardian is 
utilized by the field to enter or retrieve information regarding suspicious activity or 
threats.  It is important that all JTTF members have access and training on this system. 
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IDW is also a very important database for JTTF members because it has the capability to 
simultaneously search many different databases for information and so can be a very 
useful investigative tool. Only 60% of those surveyed had access to IDW, while 66% 
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Figure 24.   447 JTTF members’ access to databases and systems.   
 
Table 2 (below) details those JTTF members who have access and, for 
those with access, what percentage have used the system, received training, and found the 









(N = 447) 
Training Used Useful to 
Investigations 
FBI Intranet* 85% 
(n = 378) 
N/A 96% 93% 
ACS 80% 
(n = 358) 
68% 95% 91% 
Telephone Applications 62% 
(n = 278) 
51% 91% 85% 
IDW 60% 
(n = 266) 
58% 92% 89% 
Guardian 66% 
(n = 297) 
69% 85% 66% 
DEEP 21% 
(n = 93) 
45% 52% 19% 
SCION 21% 
(n = 94) 
66% 68% 63% 
SIPRNET / JWICS 28% 
(n = 123) 
48% 72% 63% 
Internet 88% 
(n = 393) 
N/A 94% 92% 
Lexis Nexis 58% 
(n = 261) 
62% 88% 85% 
ChoicePoint 65% 
(n = 289) 
59% 93% 90% 
LEO 56% 
(n = 249) 
48% 62% 43% 
 
Table 2.   JTTF members with various database accesses, training on those databases, and 
opinions regarding the usefulness of those databases. 
 
Comparisons were also made of database access by JTTF members 
according to region of the country, as illustrated in Table 3 (below). The most notable 
trend was that JTTF members in Region III had the lowest access rate for all databases 
(except LEO), compared to JTTF members in Regions I, II, and IV. Analysis of the 
results shows significant differences in database access by region. The only databases 
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that failed to yield significant differences regarding access by region were: SCION, 
Lexis-Nexis, and LEO.  Also of note is that Region I was the only region where 100% of 
JTTF members had access to the FBI Intranet. This is one database that all full-time and 
part-time JTTF members should have access to, in order to access FBI policies, guidance, 
and information; Virtual Academy; and classified email. 
 
Database / System  
ACCESS 
Region I 
(N = 91) 
Region II 
(N = 103) 
Region III 
(N = 140) 
Region IV 
(N = 113) 
FBI Intranet 100% 
(n = 91) 
90% 
(n = 93) 
68% 
(n = 95) 
88% 
(n = 99) 
ACS 93% 
(n = 85) 
86% 
(n = 89) 
66% 
(n = 92) 
81% 
(n = 92) 
Telephone Applications 77% 
(n = 70) 
71% 
(n = 73) 
46% 
(n = 65) 
62% 
(n = 70) 
IDW 66% 
(n = 60) 
70% 
(n = 72) 
44% 
(n = 62) 
64% 
(n = 72) 
Guardian 78% 
(n = 71) 
83% 
(n = 85) 
46% 
(n = 64) 
68% 
(n = 77) 
DEEP 21% 
(n = 19) 
34% 
(n = 35) 
16% 
(n = 22) 
15% 
(n = 17) 
SCION 23% 
(n = 21) 
28% 
(n = 29) 
17% 
(n = 24) 
18% 
(n = 20) 
SIPRNET / JWIC 24% 
(n = 22) 
36% 
(n = 37) 
19% 
(n = 26) 
34% 
(n = 38) 
Internet 93% 
(n = 85) 
93% 
(n = 96) 
79% 
(n = 111) 
89% 
(n = 101) 
Lexis-Nexis 68% 
(n = 62) 
65% 
(n = 67) 
50% 
(n = 70) 
55% 
(n = 62) 
Choice Point 75% 
(n = 68) 
71% 
(n = 73) 
52% 
(n = 73) 
66% 
(n = 75) 
LEO 54% 
(n = 49) 
66% 
(n = 68) 
55% 
(n = 77) 
49% 
(n = 55) 
Table 3.   JTTF members database accesses by region.   
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Comparing database access and JTTF membership status provided a 
different view. Full-time members had significantly higher access numbers on all 
databases than part-time members, as shown in Table 4 (below). 
It should be noted that, when comparing membership status, some of the 
previously mentioned trends continued.  For example, even for full-time members, only 
72% had access to IDW and 78% had access to Guardian.  Other databases yielded very 
high access numbers (such as ACS at 95%).  When considering full-time members only, 
database access needs improvement. Full-time members, who spend the majority of their 
assignments working investigations, should have access to the majority of all relevant 
databases. Access to core databases such as IDW, ACS, Guardian, and FBI Intranet 
should be within the 98-100% range. Even for part-time members, some of whom work 
cases, certain access numbers should be higher for the core databases. 
Comparisons were also made between database access and JTTF agency 
membership.  For simplification and to increase statistical power, responses were divided 
into two groups: FBI and non-FBI.   Table 4 (below) illustrates differences in database 
access for FBI JTTF members compared to non-FBI JTTF members.  FBI JTTF members 
were more likely to access to all databases and systems than non-FBI JTTF members, 
with some percentage differences as high as 50%. Analysis yielded significant 
differences regarding database access by agency membership for all databases and 
systems. (Please refer to Table 4 for specific comparisons.) This is a very important 
finding in as much as JTTF members from non-FBI agencies are supposed to work 
investigations, contribute their knowledge and experience, and be an integral part of the 
task force. The fact that non-FBI JTTF members had less access to all databases is 












(N = 347) 
Part-Time 
Members 
(N = 100) 
FBI 
(N = 201) 
Non-FBI 
(N = 245) 
FBI Intranet 98% 
(n = 341) 
37% 
(n = 37) 
100% 
(n = 201) 
72% 
(n = 177) 
ACS 95% 
(n = 331) 
27% 
(n = 27) 
99% 
(n = 199) 
65% 




(n = 258) 
20% 
(n = 20) 
90% 
(n = 180) 
40% 
(n = 98) 
IDW 72% 
(n = 249) 
17% 
(n = 17) 
80% 
(n = 160) 
43% 
(n = 106) 
Guardian 78% 
(n = 271) 
26% 
(n = 26) 
84% 
(n = 169) 
52% 
(n = 128) 
DEEP 25% 
(n = 88) 
5% 
(n = 5) 
35% 
(n = 70) 
9% 
(n = 23) 
SCION 25% 
(n = 88) 
6% 
(n = 6) 
33% 
(n = 67) 
11% 
(n = 27) 
SIPRNET / JWICS 31% 
(n = 107) 
16% 
(n = 16) 
41% 
(n = 82) 
17% 
(n = 41) 
Internet 95% 
(n = 329) 
64% 
(n = 64) 
99% 
(n = 198) 
79% 
(n = 195) 
Lexis-Nexis 63% 
(n = 219) 
42% 
(n = 42) 
71% 
(n = 143) 
48% 
(n = 118) 
Choice Point 72% 
(n = 250) 
39% 
(n = 39) 
83% 
(n = 167) 
50% 
(n = 122) 
LEO 60% 
(n = 208) 
41% 
(n = 41) 
66% 
(n = 133) 
47% 
(n = 116) 
Table 4.   JTTF members database accesses by status and agency membership.  
 
b.  Database Training 
On average, only 45-69% of those with access to all of the above listed 
databases received training on their utility and use.  In addition, those surveyed reported 
that some of these databases were not useful in supporting their investigations (i.e., DEEP 
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and LEO). There was no single database or system for which 75% or more of those 
surveyed received training. Those databases for which at least 50% of those surveyed had 
access and received training include: Guardian (69%), ACS (68%), SCION (66%), Lexis-
Nexis (62%), IDW (58%), and TA (51%). 
 
  
Figure 25.   447 JTTF members’ access to databases and systems compared to training 
received.   
 
Database access and training comparisons were also made for JTTF 
members according to region of the country. Table 5 (below) illustrates the differences in 
database training by region. The most notable trend was that Region II had the highest 
training percentages for all databases, except SIPRNET/JWICS and SCION, compared to 
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(n = 85) 
67% 
(n = 57) 
86% 
(n = 89) 
80% 
(n = 71) 
66% 
(n = 92) 
62% 
(n = 57) 
81% 
(n = 92) 
63% 




(n = 70) 
43% 
(n = 30) 
71% 
(n = 73) 
58% 
(n = 42) 
46% 
(n = 65) 
46% 
(n = 30) 
62% 
(n = 70) 
56% 
(n = 39) 
IDW 66% 
(n = 60) 
58% 
(n = 35) 
70% 
(n = 72) 
58% 
(n = 42) 
44% 
(n = 62) 
50% 
(n = 31) 
64% 
(n = 72) 
64% 
(n = 46) 
Guardian 78% 
(n = 71) 
72% 
(n = 51) 
83% 
(n = 85) 
73% 
(n = 62) 
46% 
(n = 64) 
59% 
(n = 38) 
68% 
(n = 77) 
70% 
(n = 54) 
DEEP 21% 
(n = 19) 
47% 
(n = 9) 
34% 
(n = 35) 
49% 
(n = 17) 
16% 
(n = 22) 
36% 
(n = 8) 
15% 
(n = 17) 
47% 
(n = 8) 
SCION 23% 
(n = 21) 
71% 
(n = 15) 
28% 
(n = 29) 
66% 
(n = 19) 
17% 
(n = 24) 
58% 
(n = 14) 
18% 
(n = 20) 
70% 




(n = 22) 
55% 
(n = 12) 
36% 
(n = 37) 
41% 
(n = 15) 
19% 
(n = 26) 
62% 
(n = 16) 
34% 
(n = 38) 
42% 
(n = 16) 
Lexis-Nexis 68% 
(n = 62) 
60% 
(n = 37) 
65% 
(n = 67) 
67% 
(n = 45) 
50% 
(n = 70) 
63% 
(n = 44) 
55% 
(n = 62) 
56% 
(n = 35) 
Choice Point 75% 
(n = 68) 
57% 
(n = 39) 
71% 
(n = 73) 
68% 
(n = 50) 
52% 
(n = 73) 
60% 
(n = 44) 
66% 
(n = 75) 
49% 
(n = 37) 
LEO 54% 
(n = 49) 
47% 
(n = 23) 
66% 
(n = 68) 
59% 
(n = 40) 
55% 
(n = 77) 
47% 
(n = 36) 
49% 
(n = 55) 
38% 
(n = 21) 
Table 5.   JTTF members’ database accesses compared to training received.   
 
Comparing database training and JTTF membership status provided a 
different result.  An unexpected finding was that for those full-time and part-time 
members who had access to the various databases, part-time members were more likely 
to have received training than full-time members on some of the databases, such as TA, 
IDW, SIPRNET/JWICS and LEO.  Other previously discussed trends were repeated with 
regards to the percentage of JTTF members who received training on the databases and 
systems.  For example, even when only considering full-time members, the percentage of 
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those who both had access to and received training on the databases ranged from 40-70%. 
These numbers should be considered low, as some databases are old DOS-based systems 
that require training in order to operate, even for intermediate PC users. For example, 
only 69% of full-time members surveyed reported receiving ACS training and 50% 
received TA training. This number is considered low in as much as it is difficult to teach 
oneself ACS and TA.  Please refer to Table 6 (below) for specific comparisons. 
 




(N = 347) 
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(n = 331) 
69% 
(n = 227) 
27% 
(n = 27) 
59% 
(n = 16) 
Telephone Applications 74% 
(n = 258) 
50% 
(n = 129) 
20% 
(n = 20) 
60% 
(n = 12) 
IDW 72% 
(n = 249) 
58% 
(n = 144) 
17% 
(n = 17) 
59% 
(n = 10) 
Guardian 78% 
(n = 271) 
70% 
(n = 190) 
26% 
(n = 26) 
58% 
(n = 15) 
DEEP 25% 
(n = 88) 
47% 
(n = 41) 
5% 
(n = 5) 
20% 
(n = 1) 
SCION 25% 
(n = 88) 
67% 
(n = 59) 
6% 
(n = 6) 
50% 
(n = 3) 
ADNET / SIPRNET / JWICS 31% 
(n = 107) 
46% 
(n = 49) 
16% 
(n = 16) 
63% 
(n = 10) 
Lexis-Nexis 63% 
(n = 219) 
65% 
(n = 142) 
42% 
(n = 42) 
45% 
(n = 19) 
Choice Point 72% 
(n = 250) 
61% 
(n = 152) 
39% 
(n = 39) 
46% 
(n = 18) 
LEO 60% 
(n = 208) 
48% 
(n = 99) 
41% 
(n = 41) 
51% 
(n = 21) 
Table 6.   JTTF members with database training compared to membership status.   
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Comparisons were also made between database training and JTTF agency 
membership. For simplification and to increase statistical power, responses were divided 
into two groups: FBI and non-FBI. Consistent with database access, Table 7 (below) 
illustrate differences in database training for FBI JTTF members compared to non-FBI 
JTTF members.  
 
Database / System  
TRAINING 
FBI Members With 
Access 
(N = 201) 
FBI Members 











(n = 201) 
83% 
(n = 166) 
72% 
(n = 177) 
44% 
(n = 77) 
Telephone Applications 99% 
(n = 199) 
50% 
(n = 100) 
65% 
(n = 159) 
26% 
(n = 41) 
IDW 90% 
(n = 180) 
52% 
(n = 93) 
40% 
(n = 98) 
62% 
(n = 61) 
Guardian 80% 
(n = 160) 
70% 
(n = 112) 
43% 
(n = 106) 
88% 
(n = 93) 
DEEP 84% 
(n = 169) 
17% 
(n = 29) 
52% 
(n = 128) 
10% 
(n = 13) 
SCION 35% 
(n = 70) 
66% 
(n = 46) 
9% 
(n = 23) 
70% 
(n = 16) 
SIPRNET / JWICS 33% 
(n = 67) 
51% 
(n = 34) 
11% 
(n = 27) 
93% 
(n = 25) 
Lexis Nexis 71% 
(n = 143) 
64% 
(n = 91) 
48% 
(n = 118) 
59% 
(n = 70) 
Choice Point 83% 
(n = 167) 
59% 
(n = 99) 
50% 
(n = 122) 
58% 
(n = 71) 
LEO 66% 
(n = 133) 
45% 
(n = 60) 
47% 
(n = 116) 
52% 
(n = 60) 





c.  Database and Systems Comments by JTTF Members 
A comments section was placed at the end of the database portion of the 
survey where participants could freely express any opinion they had relating to database 
access and training. A total of 216 comments were made regarding database access and 




Database training is needed 35 
Do not have access to FBI systems or databases 23 
Need more Unclassified computers 19 
LEO is problematic / not useful 18 
There are too many databases 14 
ACS is not user friendly / is problematic 11 
IDW is the most useful system 11 
Additional accesses are needed 8 
We are required to maintain too many passwords 6 
Passwords expire too quickly / too many problems with passwords 4 
Our location needs a SCION system 4 
DEEP is problematic / not useful 4 
Guardian is redundant with ACS leads 3 
Other 60 
TOTAL 216 
Table 8.   Database and systems comments. 
 
C. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
1.  Participation in Investigations 
Approximately 68% of those surveyed reported having been assigned as primary 
case agent on an FBI counterterrorism investigation. Of those surveyed, 65% reported 
having been assigned as co-case agent on an FBI counterterrorism investigation. Even if 
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you consider only full-time JTTF members, only 80% have been assigned as primary 
case agent and 78% as co-case agent in an FBI counterterrorism investigation.  
Furthermore, 22% of JTTF members (ninety-seven) had never been assigned as either 
primary or co-case agent in a counterterrorism investigation, thirty-one of whom were 
full-time JTTF members. This indicates that even some full-time members are not being 
assigned to work investigations. Of these ninety-seven who have never been assigned as 
either primary or co-case agent in a counterterrorism investigation, four were FBI agents 
and the remaining ninety-three were TFOs.  The aforementioned statistic reflects that 
TFOs are being assigned to cases at a disproportionate rate compared to FBI agents.  Of 
those who have been assigned as primary or co-case agents in an investigation, 91% 
reported they participate in file review sessions with their supervisor. This indicates there 
is still a small portion of JTTF members assigned as case agents in counterterrorism 
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Figure 26.    JTTF Members who have been assigned as either primary or co-case agent 
(from survey of 447) and those who have participated in file review sessions 
(from survey of 350). 
 69
2.  Sources and Source Training 
Approximately 47% of JTTF members surveyed reported they currently operate at 
least one source. Approximately 59% of those surveyed have operated a source in the 
past.  Approximately 37% of those JTTF members surveyed have never operated a source 
during their JTTF assignment, 88 of whom are full-time members. Seven FBI Agents 
indicated they have not operated a source while on the JTTF. The average number of 
those sources at the time of the survey was 2.48, and the number of sources operated per 
JTTF member ranged from one to twelve.   
Only 55% of JTTF members have received training on how to operate a source.  
Regarding full-time JTTF members, only 65% have received source training.  FBI agents 
were much more likely to receive source training than non-FBI agents (85% vs. 31%).  
Of those JTTF members surveyed who did receive source training, 57% rated the training 
as “average” or “above average,” 13% rated it “exceptional,” and 10% rated it “below 
average” or “poor,” with 20% missing data.    
Although TFOs are not allowed to operate a source, they may assist with issues 
related to the source(s) such as spotting, identifying, and recruiting individuals who might 
be suitable as sources. (In this respect, it may be beneficial for TFOs to have at least 
some basic source training.), Furthermore, part-time members are less likely to be 
involved with sources and more likely to work significantly fewer investigations than 
full-time members. For these reasons, comparisons were not made regarding source 
training and JTTF membership status. Comparisons were made regarding source training 
by region and agency membership.   
Analyses revealed statistically significant differences when comparing source 
training by region. Specifically, JTTF participants in Region II were most likely to 
receive source training at 69%, followed by 63% in Region I, 58% in Region IV, and 
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Figure 27.   Source training by region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region 
I, 103 for Region II, 140 for Region III, and 113 for Region IV.  
 
When comparing JTTF agency membership, the survey revealed that 85% of FBI 
agents received source training, compared to 25% of federal TFOs, 40% of state TFOs, 
and 36% of local TFOs. Grouping the TFOs a single non-FBI group yielded a more 
powerful statistical comparison: 85% of FBI Agents on the JTTF received source 
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Figure 28.   Figure 28 Source training by agency membership.  Sample sizes are as 
follows: 201 for FBI JTTF members and 245 for non-FBI JTTF members. 
 
3.  Access to Support Personnel 
Over 70% of JTTF members surveyed reported having adequate access to the 
following support personnel: Intelligence Analysts (IA), 84%; Financial Analysts (FA), 
70%; the Field Intelligence Group (FIG), 86%; surveillance support, 78%; and technical 
support, 86%. Access to financial analysts was lowest overall and access to technical 
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Figure 29.   JTTF Members access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), 
Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical coverage. 
 
Analyses revealed significant differences regarding access to support personnel 
by region.  JTTF members in Region I had the greatest access to support personnel in all 
categories (i.e., IAs, FAs, FIG, surveillance, and technical), whereas JTTF members in 
Region III reported the least access to support personnel. Analysis revealed significant 
differences between regions. Specifically, Regions I (93%) and II (92%) had greater 
access to IAs than Regions III (75%) and IV (80%).  A similar trend was found regarding 
access to the FIG, where Regions I (97%) and II (90%) had greater access than Regions 
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Figure 30.   JTTF Members’ access to Intelligence Analysts (IA), Financial Analysts (FA), 
Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS), surveillance support and technical support by 
region.  Sample sizes are as follows: ninety-one for Region I, 103 for Region II, 
140 for Region III, and 113 for Region I. 
 
A comments section was placed at the end of the personnel access portion of the 
survey where participants could freely express any comments they had related to support 
personnel. Surveyees indicated that although they may have access to support personnel 
that did not necessarily mean there were a sufficient number of support personnel 
available to accomplish the task at hand. For example one surveyee mentioned he had 
access to IAs but that his location only had one IA for the entire location. This trend is 
reflected in the comments section below.  A total of 191 comments were made regarding 
support personnel. Approximately 52% of those comments indicated a need for additional 







Need more financial analysts 44 
Need more intelligence analysts 34 
Support staff is good quality/helpful 24 
Analysts are poorly trained and lack knowledge to do the job 16 
Need more surveillance support personnel 15 
Need intelligence analysts embedded on the squads / the ability to task 
them directly to assist with casework 
15 
Need more technical support 7 
Have a sufficient amount of support staff 4 
FIG is slow to respond to requests 3 
Do not understand the role of the FIG or what they do 3 
Other 26 
TOTAL 191 
Table 9.   Support personnel comments. 
 
4. Briefings Provided by FBI Field Office 
The collection and sharing of information is an essential function of the JTTF. 
Briefings provided by FBI JTTF management to the management of participating 
agencies is a primary information-sharing mechanism. Of those non-FBI JTTF members 
surveyed, approximately 73% reported that their agency’s management is routinely 
briefed by FBI Field Office management, compared to 21%  who were not sure if their 
agency’s management is regularly briefed by the FBI and 4% who reported their 
agency’s management was never briefed by the FBI, with 2% missing data.  Of those 
who reported their agency’s management is routinely briefed by the FBI, 6% reported the 
briefings occur daily, followed by 27% weekly, 32% monthly, 29% quarterly, 2% semi-
annually, and 4% annually.  It was reported that the SSA conducts the majority of these 
briefings (29%), followed by the ASAC (21%), SAC (12%), and other individual(s) 
(7%), with 31% missing data.  Figure 31 (below) details the frequency of these briefings. 
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Figure 31.   Frequency of briefings to TFO Management by FBI. 
 
5.  Field Office Leadership and Management Skills 
Overall, the majority of JTTF members surveyed rated their FBI Field Office 
management (i.e., SSA, ASAC, and SAC) favorably. For those JTTF members who rated 
their SSA as “below average” or “poor,” lack of managerial and communication skills 
were the reasons provided most often. For those who rated their ASAC and/or SAC as 
“below average” or “poor,” lack of contact was the most common reason provided, 
followed by lack of managerial and communication skills.  One noticeable trend was that 
as the supervisor’s responsibility increased, the number of JTTF members who could not 
provide a rating due to limited or no contact with that supervisor also increased.  That is, 
JTTF members were most likely to state they could not give a rating due to lack of 
contact for SACs, followed by ASACs, and then SSAs.   
Approximately 48% of those surveyed rated their SSA as “average” or “above 
average” on leadership skills, with 39% being rated as “exceptional” and 5% being rated 
as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on 
leadership skills due to insufficient contact with their SSA and 1% refused to give a 
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rating, with 2% missing data. Approximately 46% of those surveyed rated their ASAC as 
“average” or “above average” on leadership skills, with 25% being rated as “exceptional” 
and 6% being rated as “below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not 
provide ratings on leadership skills due to insufficient contact with their ASAC 21% and 
1% refused to give a rating, with 1% missing data.  
Approximately 38% of those surveyed rated their SAC as “average” or “above 
average” on leadership skills, with 27%  rated as “exceptional,” and 4% rated as “below 
average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on leadership skills 
due to insufficient contact with their SAC (28%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 
































Figure 32.   447 JTTF members’ ratings of FBI field office management on leadership 
skills.  Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and missing data 
were not included. 
 
Approximately 50% of those surveyed rated their SSA as “average” or “above 




“below average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on 
management skills due to insufficient contact with their SSA (6%) and 1% refused to 
give a rating, with 2% missing data.    
Approximately 46% of those surveyed rated their ASAC as “average” or “above 
average” on management skills, with 24% rated as “exceptional” and 6% rated as “below 
average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on management skills 
due to insufficient contact with their ASAC (21%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 
2% missing data. 
Approximately 38% of those surveyed rated their SAC as “average” or “above 
average” on management skills, with 26% rated as “exceptional” and 5% rated as “below 
average” or “poor.” Some JTTF members could not provide ratings on management skills 
due to insufficient contact with their SAC (28%) and 1% refused to give a rating, with 


































Figure 33.   Figure 33 JTTF Members’ ratings of FBI field office Management on 
leadership skills.  Those JTTF members who refused to provide ratings and 
missing data were not included. 
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6.  Final Comments by JTTF Members 
A comments section was placed at the end of the survey where participants could 
freely express any additional comments they had, relating to the FBI or the JTTF 
program and not already mentioned.  A total of 400 additional comments were made.  
Table 10 (below) lists the most common categories of comments and their frequency. 
 
COMMENT FREQUENCY 
FBI Field Office Management are competent/supportive/responsive 61 
JTTF is a good program/has been a positive experience 38 
TFOs need training when they first arrive at the JTTF 26 
High turnover of FBI Management is a problem/negatively impacts the 
JTTF Program 
18 
Surveyee is a part-time member without accesses who only attends JTTF 
meetings 
18 
FBI Field Office Management are not supportive/incompetent/not 
responsive 
17 
Surveyee has little to no interaction with FBI Management 16 
Need a “how-to” manual or SOP guidebook for 315 investigations 16 
Need a TFO mentoring/orientation program 12 
JTTF location has a brand new SSA, ASAC, or SAC 11 
JTTF is a good information sharing/liaison environment 10 
Training is needed on how to operate sources 10 
Need more staff/JTTF members 10 
Information sharing is poor 7 
TFOs are underutilized 7 
New FBI Agents lack counterterrorism training and investigative 
experience 
6 
FBI needs to improve liaison with other agencies 6 
Need more funding for equipment and tools to aid investigations 5 
TFO clearances need to be completed before they arrive at their JTTF 
assignment 
4 
TFOs should complete 1-week of training at Quantico 3 
A Best Practices program is needed 2 
Other 97 
TOTAL 400 
Table 10.   Final comments. 
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D. REVISION OF THE MASTER JTTF FIELD MEMBERSHIP ROSTER 
At the time the telephone survey began, the master JTTF membership listing, 
which is housed at the NJTTF and to which all 102 JTTF locations contribute their 
membership listings, consisted of 4,589 members. Local JTTF coordinators are 
responsible for maintaining and updating a JTTF roster for their respective locations.  
Information on the roster reflects the participant’s parent agency, and its status on the 
JTTF (i.e. full-time, part-time, or liaison). It was discovered this master listing was 
grossly inaccurate for two reasons.  First, there was no delineation between part-time and 
liaison JTTF members.  As a result of the telephone survey, it was discovered that a large 
portion of members listed as part-time actually held liaison status, serving as points of 
contact or only attending monthly meetings held by the JTTF. These liaison-type 
members were not working investigations, did not have access to FBI databases or 
systems, and some did not have unescorted access to the FBI building. A second problem 
was that, of the 705 JTTF members contacted for the survey, 30% were no longer on the 
JTTF. It appeared JTTF locations were adding new members to their lists without 
deleting members no longer assigned to the JTTF.  
To establish uniform membership designations across the 101 local JTTFs, the 
NJTTF sent an electronic communication on March 13, 2007, requesting all JTTF 
locations to send the NJTTF updated listings of their JTTF members, in accordance with 
the guidance and criteria delineating parameters for full-time and part-time members. By 
standardizing and defining membership criteria, the NJTTF identified minimum 
standards for JTTF participation. An accurate designation of membership status is a 
necessary precursor to the delineation of roles and responsibilities. It was determined that 
the following minimum conditions must be in place for an employee to be considered a 
full-time participant on a local JTTF: appropriate security clearances; full access to FBI 
computer systems, including FBI databases; assignment of work area within the JTTF 
space; majority of work time dedicated to JTTF investigations and assignments; required 
to report to JTTF space for work; and, in the case of state and local members, eligible to 
receive overtime reimbursement. 
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Part-time participation includes the following criteria: appropriate security 
clearances (or assignment to the JTTF pending clearance); limited computer access; 
although spending the majority of time conducting investigations and providing support 
to the parent agency, the TFO must maintain a caseload with the JTTF; must not be 
solely on-call and/or in telephone contact with the JTTF; must maintain workspace at 
JTTF site; and must report to JTTF space to complete work. All other personnel who do 
not meet these criteria were designated liaison status and maintain contact with the JTTFs 
for information exchange and support on an ad hoc basis. 
As of May 9, 2007, forty-seven of the fifty-six field divisions had responded to 
the request for updated listings. Based on the new criteria, total JTTF membership 
decreased by 30%, with full-time membership down 11% and part-time membership 
decreased by 78%. Nine field divisions had yet to complete their new listings. The total 
number of JTTF members (full-time and part-time) has decreased from 5,031 to 3,522. 
Selecting formal criteria to establish membership status was an important 
precursor to delineating roles and responsibilities.  To facilitate this process the NJTTF 
initiated, in collaboration with federal partners that participate on local JTTFs, a uniform 
memorandum of understanding (MOU). This document was finalized and executed 
during the spring of 2007. Local JTTF remain responsible for negotiating and executing 
MOUs with the executive management of state and local participants, subject to review 
and approval by FBI HQ. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of this survey suggest FBI-CTD is not providing JTTF members with 
the tools they need to do their jobs effectively. Although the survey results were not 
dismal, they did reveal that not enough JTTF members – as a whole – receive sufficient 
substantive training, database access and training on how to use databases, and training 
on how to operate sources. Nor are there a sufficient number of support personnel to aid 
investigations. In addition, there were significant differences regarding the provision of 
these tools based on geographic region, JTTF membership status, and JTTF agency 
membership. Results suggest TFOs receive less training, access, and tools to aid 
investigations overall than FBI JTTF members. This is very problematic, as TFOs are 
tasked with the same responsibilities as FBI agents in counterterrorism investigations.  
TFOs are asked to work investigations, contribute their knowledge and experience, and 
be integral members of the task force. The fact that TFOs are less likely to receive 
substantive training, database access, and training, and yet may be assigned as primary or 
co-case agent in an investigation, goes against the JTTF concept. Part-time members, in 
general, receive fewer tools than full-time members.  Although this is somewhat to be 
expected, if CTD wants part-time members to conduct investigations as part of their 
JTTF assignment, certain minimal tools must be provided (such as introductory training 
and database access).  Finally, JTTF members in Region III seem to have the fewest tools 
afforded to them. In general, they ranked lowest on substantive training, database access 
and training, source training, and access to support personnel. 
The CTD survey was significant in as much as it corroborated previous 
deficiencies identified by NAPA and DOJ OIG, in 2003 and 2005 respectively.  
Moreover, the survey highlighted the fact that inconsistencies previously uncovered had 
not been rectified and recommendations for improvement had yet to be fully embraced.  
Specifically, NAPA had recommended an increased emphasis on human resource 
planning, including a performance driven management system concerning training and 
development, and advocated that FBI management would need to adopt such a system to 
fully develop the capabilities and skills of task force participants.   
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The DOJ OIG had criticized the FBI for not adopting a national training plan to 
ensure that all JTTF’s members had received basic counterterrorism training as promised 
by Director Mueller in 2003. As of 2006, the FBI training and development program for 
counterterrorism was still incremental in nature and applied in an inconsistent and 
disproportionate manner in relation to agency designation, membership status, and 
geographic region.  Moreover, the training and development program was ill-defined and 
lacked the outcome-oriented performance measures necessary to assess training efficacy, 
strategies, operations, and resources. 
Most, if not all, JTTF participants are from traditional law enforcement agencies. 
As such, many of these individuals have little if any training and/or experience regarding 
counterterrorism matters.  Substantive training is necessary to understand the structure 
and modus operandi of both international and domestic terrorist organizations, groups, 
and threats. Training and development is also necessary to understand the cultural 
makeup and the destructive arsenal of weapons available to potential adversaries. Finally, 
legal training is needed so that JTTF members can conduct investigations in conformance 
with applicable laws and guidelines. In light of the above, the survey determined that, 
subsequent to assignment, a significant number of task force members are not receiving 
the full complement of basic substantive training offered by the FBI. Moreover, study 
results indicate that training opportunities are inconsistent and vary based on agency 
membership and geographic location.  
Once basic training has been completed, it is essential that JTTF participants have 
a fundamental understanding of the available counterterrorism investigatory tools and 
procedures. In traditional criminal investigations standard tools include, but are not 
limited to, subpoenas, search warrants, and wiretaps. In the counterterrorism realm, 
standard tools include National Security Letters (NSLs) and Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) requests. Counterterrorism tools are significantly different than 
their criminal counterparts. For this reason, JTTF members must be educated and trained 
concerning the relevance, application, and legal parameters vis-à-vis the use of these 
tools. The survey determined that a significant number of JTTF members have not 
requested a NSL and/or participated in preparing a FISA request. Again, although web-
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based training is available on the use of NSLs and FISAs, accountability and oversight to 
monitor education and training concerning these tools is lacking. Moreover, the JTTF 
survey determined that FBI special agents participating on the task force are utilizing the 
aforementioned tools far more than non-FBI participants. The reason for this disparity 
was unclear and could be attributed to a lack of training, participation on cases, or a 
combination of the two. 
Information is one of the most useful tools in the JTTF arsenal. To “connect the 
dots,” and determine relationships and patterns that may be indicators of prospective 
terrorist activity, JTTF participants must understand what databases are available and the 
significance of that information. JTTF members must have access in order to extract 
pertinent information. Properly utilized, these databases can provide valuable knowledge 
concerning individuals of interest to include travel, financial activity, and relationships 
with other individuals and organizations.  
With regard to JTTF membership status, significant differences were found in 
access to and training on all databases. Part-time members and non-FBI members were 
significantly less likely to have access to all databases and systems. Percentage 
differences in access were significant, with 12% for part-time versus 68% for full-time 
members, and 34% for FBI versus 14% for non-FBI members. Even when considering 
only full-time members, access and training needs significant improvement. Full-time 
members, who spend the majority of their JTTF assignment working investigations, 
should have access to the majority, if not all, of these databases.  Core databases such as 
IDW, ACS, Guardian, and FBI Intranet should be within the 98 to 100% range.   
Moreover, a large number of task force members who do have access have not received 
training concerning database tools and their utility. Access and training concerning 
database tools are imperative for the JTTFs to accomplish their mission. 
The CTD survey also sought to evaluate other core processes essential to the 
success of the JTTF program. These processes include the participation by task force 
members in Preliminary Investigations (PI) and Full Field Investigations (FFI) and in the 
identification and recruitment of human sources (HUMINT). Unfortunately, the survey 
determined that non-FBI JTTF participants are assigned to JTTF cases at a 
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disproportionately lower rate, as compared to FBI personnel.  In order to accomplish 
objectives, the knowledge, experience, and expertise of TFOs must be fully integrated 
into the JTTF program. This includes participation in investigations and source 
development. The recruitment and operation of sources is critical in establishing a 
working knowledge of the JTTF domain necessary to penetrate terrorist cells and 
organizations. Moreover JTTF personnel, regardless of agency membership, are not 
receiving adequate training concerning source development. Only 57% of full-time JTTF 
members have received source training. It is incumbent on the CTD to design and employ 
a comprehensive source training program.  
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the FBI re-allocated personnel and 
resources from traditional criminal investigations to counterterrorism to build an 
intelligence program responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).81 To fully 
integrate the FBI into the intelligence community, it has been necessary for the FBI to 
shift its primary focus from the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases to the 
detection, disruption, and dismantlement of terrorist groups and the prevention of terrorist 
attacks. A fundamental component in this process is the recruitment and development of 
human intelligence sources (HUMINT) to fill intelligence gaps and fulfill intelligence 
requirements.  
It is critical to the JTTF mission that training and education programs are 
developed and implemented to cultivate the skills necessary to detect and disrupt non-
traditional actors, including self-radicalized, autonomous cells and lone actors who derive 
their inspiration and/or ideology from existing terrorist organizations. HUMINT is 
essential because terrorists and their supporters often are not involved in criminal activity 
that would bring them under the scrutiny of law enforcement. Training and education 
concerning source development should include, but not be limited to, recruitment,  
 
 
                                                 
81 United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Statement of Gary M. Bald, Executive Assistant 
Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation 109th Cong., Session 1, September 
21, 2005 
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management, vetting, validation, etc.  Prospective JTTF HUMINT training programs 
would also cover applicable FBI and attorney general guidelines, policies, and 
procedures.  
The CTD evaluation also addressed the perceived quality of field office 
leadership and management. The survey assessed collaborative processes including the 
frequency and consistency of information sharing between the FBI and agencies that 
participate on the JTTF. Seventy-three percent of TFO survey participants stated that 
collaborative mechanisms such as information sharing through routine FBI management 
briefings were being held on a consistent basis. A significant portion of the remaining 
survey participants, 23%, were unsure if briefings were held on a routine basis. Senior 
JTTF management routinely conducts briefings where information is shared through the 
JTTF Executive Board. In as much as Executive Board membership is primarily 
comprised of agency heads, it is not unreasonable that rank-and-file JTTF members 
might be unaware of these meetings. 
Overall leadership and management skills were ranked high by survey 
participants.82 SSAs were ranked the highest in both leadership and management skill 
categories, with scores of 87% in both.  ASACs were next highest, with scores of 71% 
and 70% respectively. SACs received scores of 65% and 64% respectively and all of the 
management categories scored less than 10% in the “poor” designation, indicating that 
surveyees were satisfied with JTTF leadership and management capabilities. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Strategic change and the transformation necessary to culturally convert the FBI 
from a traditional law enforcement agency focused on the investigation and prosecution 
of criminal matters into a world-class intelligence agency whose primary mission is 
detecting and disrupting terrorist threats will take unprecedented focus and organizational 
commitment. Organizational cultures, especially government bureaucracies such as the 
FBI, change gradually.83 Significant organizational and cultural obstacles must be 
overcome to accomplish this task. From an organizational standpoint, FBI executive 
management must lead the way by communicating a clear and compelling vision that 
succinctly articulates goals and objectives. This vision must prioritize training, 
development, and educational opportunities to build and cultivate skills and competencies 
needed to address new organizational objectives. Centralized planning and significant 
human capital investments will be imperative. To initiate and sustain strategic change, it 
is necessary for executive leadership to employ structural and organizational drivers that 
encourage innovative practices, new ideas, and the importation and adaptation of best 
practices and lessons learned from both internal and external sources. 
Recommendations reflected herein were formulated to address areas in need of 
improvement within the JTTF Program, based on the results of the JTTF Telephone 
Survey and the external studies and surveys detailed above. Recommendations focus on 
the following areas: (1) role definitions for JTTF members, (2) a revised master JTTF 
field membership listing, (3) substantive training and database training, (4) a 
mentoring/Field Training agent program for TFOs, (5) a Lessons Learned/Best Practices 
program, (6) implementation of systems to ensure oversight and accountability, (7) 
source development and training, and (8) future surveys of the JTTF program/evaluation 
of JTTF program changes.  Please refer to the recommendations section of this thesis for 
further details. 
 
                                                 
83 James Q.  Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 91. 
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Although JTTFs have proven efficient, this research has determined that there is 
little uniformity system-wide and effectiveness varies based on location. To optimize 
effectiveness, it is necessary to identify and implement best and/or smart practices, 
especially those plans, policies, and procedures which ensure that the skills, experience, 
and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly integrated into the 
JTTF program. The implementation of standardized written procedures which detail 
roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information 
sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. 
Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides the flexibility to 
evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies on the part of participant 
stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program. Comprehensive 
training and development programs are necessary to develop the skills and expertise to 
bridge the cultural gap between traditional law enforcement responsibilities and 
intelligence and national security priorities. 
A. TRAINING DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 
Personnel assigned to local JTTFs play an integral role in the Homeland Security 
mission of detecting, disrupting, and preventing terrorism. In achieving these objectives, 
the importance of training, development, and education cannot be underestimated.  Prior 
to assignment to the JTTF, a significant number of state, local, and federal participants 
have had little, if any, formal counterterrorism education, experience, and/or training. To 
ensure the seamless integration of TFO personnel, education, training, and development 
resources are imperative. As such, it is incumbent on the JTTF to devise and implement 
education and training programs that provide the knowledge, skills, and competencies 
needed to optimize JTTF participation. Education and training must provide core 
capabilities necessary to effectively respond to current and future threats in accordance 
with organizational goals and objectives. The training plan should link education, 
training, and development with JTTF core values and the FBI strategic plan.. 
The implementation of a comprehensive training and development program is 
consistent with 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the FBI take necessary 
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measures to institutionalize a preventive counterterrorism posture. This process includes 
developing an institutional culture, with the requisite expertise in intelligence and 
national security matters, and the recruitment, training and retention of key employees.84  
The need for effective counterterrorism training and development was reinforced in May 
of 2002, during the second phase of the FBI's reorganization, when personnel resources 
from traditional criminal investigations were reassigned to counterterrorism and 
intelligence investigations. In making the aforementioned changes the FBI recognized 
that training and education would be necessary to close critical skill gaps.85 
Existing and prospective training and development scenarios were impacted in 
May 2006 when the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) announced the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard methodology as part of the Strategy 
Management System. The Balanced Scorecard methodological approach aligns key 
strategies with concurrent performance metrics in order to evaluate the success of 
resulting actions.  It provides a strategic management framework that translates strategy 
into operational objectives, which in turn drive both behavior and performance.  
Organizational strategy is implemented and managed through the linkage of objectives, 
initiatives, and measures.  An integral part of this process involves the implementation 
and use of learning and development tools.86 As such, training goals and objectives must 
be consistent with human capital goals and appropriate performance measures and targets 
developed to evaluate the program.  
To promote uniformity and consistency, a detailed implementation plan is 
imperative. The plan should address challenges and set quantifiable short- and long-term 
goals that align task force goals and objectives with the specific strategies designed to 
                                                 
84 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on \Terrorist Attacks on the United States (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2004), 425. 
85 David Walker, FBI reorganization: initial steps encouraging but broad transformation needed 
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 21 June 2002), 23. 
86 FBI Counterterrorism Division, Implementing the Balanced Scorecard to Become a Strategy 
Focused Organization (Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 2006), 1. 
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achieve them.87 As such, the implementation should ensure that adequate funding is 
available for training programs and to establish training councils for oversight and 
accountability. Prudent budgeting is essential to provide resources necessary to achieve 
organizational goals. This process would include cultivating relationships with external 
sources to provide training and development opportunities. These resources include, but 
are not limited to, universities, the National Executive Institute, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Department of Homeland Security, and other public and private organizations.  
Historically, the FBI has always sought to provide special agent and task force 
personnel with training and development opportunities. New special agent hires must 
complete a rigorous eighteen-week training and development program at Quantico, 
Virginia prior to field office assignment.  Additional training and development programs 
are available through Quantico, regional sites, and at local field offices. Training is also 
available on-line through web-based programs on the FBI intranet via a program called 
Virtual Academy. In addition to existing programs, new training modules are routinely 
proposed and/or are under development. However, many of the training and development 
programs that impact the JTTF are disjointed, inconsistent, and created in an incremental 
fashion, often in response to a problem, criticism, and/or perceived deficiency. Moreover, 
as evidenced by the CTD survey, implementation and application of existing programs is 
often inconsistent and inequitable. A detailed implementation plan would alleviate the 
aforementioned inefficiencies by coordinating training and making the most efficient use 
of resources.88 
In a multidisciplinary task-force environment, strategic change and transformation 
involve a complex interplay between personnel resources, organizations, policies, and 
procedures. To deal with a continually evolving asymmetrical threat, training and 
development plans and strategies must be flexible in order to optimally educate and train 
scarce personnel resources. For the JTTF to be effective, the development and 
implementation of a cogent, comprehensive, and consistent training and development 
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program is essential. Most, if not all, JTTF training-related activities are mission related 
and so impact both internal and external stakeholders. To insure that the program is 
inclusive, collaborative, and responsive to critical needs, input is needed from agencies 
that participate on the JTTF and key external homeland security stakeholders. This is a 
dynamic and inclusive process that solicits the points of view, experiences, insights, and 
priorities from divergent stakeholders, both internal and external. This is an iterative and 
flexible process, whereby useful ideas and best practices can be integrated and revised as 
necessary.89 
A comprehensive training and development program will play a critical role in 
FBI and JTTF transformation efforts. The development and implementation of 
quantifiable performance measures, with accompanying target metrics, are needed to 
evaluate whether the training and education curriculum is useful and linked to 
organizational goals and objectives.90  An evaluation process that incorporates feedback 
from multiple perspectives is needed in order that adjustments and improvements can be 
made as necessary. Oversight and accountability can be provided by establishing training 
councils and/or committees that include the stakeholders identified above. The 
committees would be responsible for training evaluation, the identification and 
implementation of shared knowledge/best practices, and oversight of the training 
curriculum.91 Additional responsibilities would include training compliance, 
identification of training opportunities, and modification of curriculum as needed to 
ensure core competencies and skills are optimized. This process would include 
cultivating relationships that provide training and development opportunities with the 
external sources mentioned above.  
Oversight and accountability responsibilities would include implementing a 
framework to evaluate, assess, and make strategic recommendations concerning the 
program. This audit process would identify specific results-oriented performance 
                                                 
89 Dr. Charles A.  Stevenson, People, Organizations, and Processes. Speech at the National War 
College, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2001, 34.  
90 FBI Counterterrorism Division, Implementing the Balanced Scorecard,  5. 
91 Ibid., 17. 
 92
measures linked to identified targets. In order to assess the efficacy of training courses 
and exercises, it is recommended that the training program design and use quantifiable 
standards, such as a matrix to evaluate training curriculum against organizational 
objectives. The evaluation framework can be segmented into four interrelated phases: 
planning/analysis, design/development, implementation, and evaluation. The evaluation 
process should be iterative, with input from management personnel representing CTD, 
JTTF field office coordinators, field office training coordinators, the NJTTF, and local, 
state, and federal stakeholders. The creation of a training council, comprised of the 
representatives identified above and those from local participating agencies, would be a 
valuable mechanism for fostering collaboration and coordination concerning training and 
development matters. Council oversight will help maximize training resources and 
identify best practices for integration into the training program.92 
A successful training and development program is a proactive endeavor whereby 
systemic processes are put place to forecast future needs, anticipate emergent issues, and 
incorporate best practices and lessons learned. The organizational structure must be 
conducive to aligning training and development processes with stated goals and 
objectives. On an organizational level, learning, training, and professional development 
must become culturally ingrained; this is only possible through the sustained commitment 
of executive management. This process includes formulating a clear and compelling 
strategic vision concerning training and development goals and objectives.  Thereafter, 
executive management must succinctly and pervasively communicate this vision, and the 
importance of training and development, throughout the organization.  
1. Curriculum and Implementation 
To effectively participate, JTTF personnel must have a baseline understanding of 
international and domestic terrorist organizations and their support networks. It is also 
beneficial if personnel involved in JTTF activities are familiar with different cultural and 
religious nuances that might impact investigations. Training and development must also 
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cultivate the skills, awareness, and recognition necessary to prevent terrorist acts utilizing 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN). This training should 
include an awareness and recognition of basic safety procedures and proper response 
protocols.  
In light of the above, it is recommended that all JTTF task force participants 
receive minimum mandatory training concerning International Terrorism (IT); Domestic 
Terrorism (DT); Muslim and Arab Culture (MAC); and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). Whenever practical, JTTF participants should attend basic In-Service Training 
pertinent to their area of assignment, as soon as possible, especially the Basic IT and 
Basic DT courses. Absent exigent circumstances, this training should be provided to all 
full-time JTTF personnel within the first ninety days of assignment, and to all part-time 
participants within the first six months. Depending on budgetary constraints, it is 
recommended that the basic training identified above be provided at the FBI Academy 
and/or other designated regional sites in close proximity to, or at, larger Field Divisions.  
If unable to attend basic In-Service Training, and/or in the event In-Service Training is 
unavailable, full-time members would be required to complete core web-based training 
through the FBI Virtual Academy. In light of the above it is recommended that the 
Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) and the Training 
and Development Unit (TDU) at the FBI Academy design and create web-based core 
modules covering Basic IT/DT, WMD, and MAC, accessible through the Virtual 
Academy. 
In addition to the four modules identified above, training and education must 
develop a fundamental institutional knowledge of other core JTTF tools and processes 
including, but not limited to, investigative techniques, source development, legal issues, 
FISA, NSLs, administrative procedures, available databases, and classification and 
security issues. This process would provide education and training on how to investigate 
terrorist organizations within existing legal and procedural parameters. Progress has been 
made in this area and future curriculum and programs can draw and expand on identified 
best practices. As an example, the NJTTF and National Security Branch (NSB) devised 
and employed a computer-based training and orientation course of study through the FBI 
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Virtual Academy. The NJTTF course was intended for newly-assigned JTTF task force 
officers and special agent personnel. The curriculum was a collaborative effort designed 
by veteran task force officers and a FBI supervisory special agent assigned to the NJTTF 
in concert with the Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) 
and the Training and Development Unit (TDU) at the FBI Academy. As currently 
configured, the program consists of ten modules designed to provide JTTF personnel core 
information necessary to properly and lawfully conduct a domestic and/or international 
terrorism investigation. To promote uniformity, the modules were designed to provide 
standardized, trackable, self-paced training, accessible through the FBI Intranet. 
As only 57% of full-time JTTF members have received source training, it is 
incumbent on the CTD to design a comprehensive source training program. It is critical 
to the JTTF mission that training and education programs are developed and implemented 
to cultivate the skills necessary to detect and disrupt non-traditional actors.  HUMINT is 
essential because terrorists and their supporters are often not involved in criminal activity 
and therefore human reporting is necessary to ascertain motives and intentions.. Training 
and education concerning source development should include, but not be limited to, the 
recruitment, management, vetting, and validation of sources. Prospective JTTF HUMINT 
training programs would also cover applicable FBI and Attorney General Guidelines, 
policies and procedures.  
FBI databases are a necessary and important tool in counterterrorism 
investigations. They contain critical background information concerning individuals of 
interest and can also provide vital information linking individuals and organizations. As 
such, an understanding of, and access to, database tools is essential. JTTF full and part-
time personnel should receive mandatory training to establish an awareness of the 
relevance and utility of various computer databases. Full- and part-time participants 
would receive this training within the first ninety days of assignment to a JTTF. It is 
recommended that web-based module(s) of instruction be devised and implemented in 
Virtual Academy concerning the following key databases:  FBINET/ Intranet; Automated 
Case Support (ACS); Telephone Applications (TA); Investigative Data Warehouse 
(IDW); Guardian Threat Tracking System; SIPRINET/JWICS; Lexis-Nexis; Choice 
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Point/Auto Track; and Law Enforcement Online (LEO). These training modules would 
be an accessible resource that can subsequently be referred to as needed during the course 
of investigations. 
The NJTTF mandated all new personnel with less than one year of JTTF 
experience participate in core web-based training programs, and required that the training 
be completed within one month of gaining access to FBI computer systems. As detailed 
in the CTD survey, this has been problematic because a significant number of JTTF 
members have not been provided timely computer access subsequent to assignment. In 
response to the computer access problems identified in the CTD survey, in April 2007, 
the Intelligence Directorate Security Division approved the Counterterrorism Division’s 
request for additional Automated Case Support (ACS) functionality and case query 
access for all non-FBI personnel detailed to local JTTFs. In light of the above, it is 
recommended that all JTTF members receive security clearances prior to formal 
participation on the JTTF and be granted computer access immediately after the security 
clearance process is adjudicated. 
B. MENTORING/FIELD TRAINING OFFICER PROGRAM 
Training and development should not be limited to web-based modules via the 
virtual Academy in structure classroom curriculum, but should also include practical 
experience through structured exercises and on-the-job training.  In addition to providing 
valuable skills and knowledge to the recipient, on-the-job training would provide 
management with an important tool to assess the weaknesses and capabilities of task 
force participants. On-the-job training could be provided through a mentoring program, 
whereby experienced senior task force members would share responsibility with the task 
force supervisor and training coordinator in assisting new task force members in 
developing the necessary skills and competencies.  
The existing FBI Probationary Training program can be used as a model. New 
SAs are assigned an experienced training agent (TA) when deployed to a field office. 
Thereafter the TA, field office squad supervisor (SSA), and field office training 
coordinator would share responsibility for ensuring that the new SAs acquire the 
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experience, skills, and competencies necessary to succeed on the job. It is the TA’s 
responsibility to ensure the probationary SA successfully participates in a wide variety of 
core mission-specific tasks. The new SA is continually evaluated during the probationary 
period. Weaknesses and areas in need of improvement are identified and corrective 
actions are taken to rectify deficiencies. This process is an effective tool to ensure that 
new SAs develop the requisite competencies, skills, and abilities to successfully perform 
essential job functions.  A similar mentoring program would benefit non-FBI task force 
personnel in providing structure guidance and on-the-job training. 
Proper orientation, familiarization, access, and on-the-job training contribute to 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to succeed on the JTTF.  Upon assignment, 
it is recommended that an experienced special agent and/or task force officer be 
designated as the Field Training Officer (FTO) responsible for providing the guidance, 
knowledge, and direction necessary to develop requisite skills and abilities. The 
FTO/mentor would be responsible for acclimating new TFOs to the JTTF.  Additional 
FTO duties would include providing TFOs with the guidance and orientation necessary to 
familiarize TFOs with applicable investigative techniques, office orientation, security 
issues, computer resources, information sharing procedures, training and development 
opportunities, investigative techniques, asset and source policies, administrative matters, 
and other pertinent information. The FTO would work with the division’s training 
coordinator and JTTF coordinator to see that the TFO completes the core training 
modules outlined above in a timely manner, and that training received is effective, 
complete, and responsive. The FTO would also identify and secure appropriate and 
relevant educational and training opportunities. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED/BEST PRACTICES PROGRAM 
To transform and navigate strategic change, it is critical that the FBI identify, 
memorialize, and implement best practices to expand the agency’s institutional 
knowledge base. As part of this process, it is important to examine lessons learned and 
best practices in a systematic way to capture accumulated knowledge, insights, and 
procedures so these processes can be utilized to enhance job performance and 
institutional efficiency. This process is especially applicable in an organization 
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experiencing a significant shift in workforce demographics, whereby veteran employees 
are increasingly replaced by new personnel.  The ultimate goal is to vest knowledge, best 
practices and lessons learned, in the organization rather than the individual. Methods used 
by other intelligence agencies and the military provide useful examples of programs to 
identify and capture best practices. 
The process of capturing lessons learned has been examined and studied by other 
federal agencies, the military, and by the private sector. The Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) recognizes the importance of identifying and adopting lessons learned. At the 
Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), the CIA examines the ways that organizations 
capture, manage, and disseminate useful practices and how these principles can be 
applied in the intelligence community. The CSI solicits input and insight from scholars 
with expertise in knowledge management and organizational learning. Useful information 
is also procured from intelligence, military, and private sector professionals. The CSI 
goal is to craft a lessons-learned program that will ensure accumulated knowledge and 
insights are efficiently documented, analyzed, and communicated to individuals in the 
organization.93 The CIA recognizes that the process of information and knowledge 
sharing must become an integral part of the organization’s culture and mission.94 
For large organizations, transformation and navigating strategic change can be 
complex and problematic. Dr. David Garvin, professor of business administration at 
Harvard Business School, studied large complex organizations and how they learn and 
adapt to change in an organizational context. Dr. Garvin identified two types of 
organizations: performance organizations and learning organizations. Performance 
organizations promote a culture whereby positive performance is rewarded by promotion 
and/or incentives and mistakes result in adverse consequences or even dismissal.  
Learning organizations tolerate errors and mistakes as part of an iterative learning 
process. To be effective, companies, organizations, and agencies must balance the two 
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models. Part of the learning organizational model incorporates the creation, acquisition, 
interpretation, transferal, and retention of knowledge.  Many organizations possess one or 
two of the aforementioned attributes, but few assimilate and integrate the entire skill set.  
For example, creating knowledge is a process that encourages diversity; however, skills 
such as the transferal of retained knowledge require standardization, replication, and 
repetition.  An organization must be flexible in order to modify behavior that incorporates 
acquired knowledge and insight.95 
To identify and incorporate best practices, organizations must engage in the 
following procedures: collect information and intelligence concerning the agency’s 
operating environment, to include understanding the competitor and/or enemy; learn from 
the best practices of other organizations or through benchmarking; identify and learn 
from internal organizational successes and failures; experiment with new processes and 
approaches; encourage systematic problem-solving; and transfer knowledge and lessons 
learned throughout the organization. 
Three of the aforementioned practices are particularly important in a law 
enforcement/intelligence agency context.  The first is benchmarking, which is the search 
for best practices both internally and externally. The search for best practices should be a 
proactive exercise whereby stakeholders responsible for implementation are active 
participants in the search process.96 
The second key activity is learning from past experience.  Few organizations 
allocate the time and expense and/or expend the energy to systemically review and 
analyze core processes and events in order to memorialize findings in a format that can 
be utilized by others in the organization. One exception is the U.S. Army, an organization 
adept at systematically reviewing events and conducting after-action reviews, which 
contribute to accumulated organizational knowledge. To facilitate this process, the U.S. 
Army formed the Center for Lessons Learned and uses small units and collection teams 
to collect useful information and intelligence. This information is thereafter memorialized 
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and made accessible through formalized learning plans that catalog activities. These 
small teams and/or networks report their findings through verbal, written, and electronic 
media and document knowledge acquired through operational experiences, exercises, and 
supporting activities.97 These activities are thereafter memorialized, blueprinted, 
categorized, and made available through formalized learning plans that catalogue 
activities.98 This process enables the military to optimize achievements by identifying 
emerging issues and trends.99 
The third essential activity is the transference of knowledge. An organization can 
transfer knowledge through a variety of ways, including written, oral, and visual formats. 
Site visits and surveys are also valuable mechanisms to share information.  Good lessons- 
learned/best practices programs are non-evaluative and non-prescriptive, but capture key 
insights which provide the decision maker flexibility to draw conclusions and implement 
changes. Lessons learned must focus on multiple core mission functions including, but 
not limited to, mission-critical support activities, recruitment, training, logistics, security, 
etc. The program should take a multidisciplinary approach so that valuable insights can 
be gleaned both internally and from external practitioners and subject matter experts.   
Input and insight from mission managers are necessary to ensure lessons learned 
and knowledge acquired are relevant and actionable. Adequate resources and sustained 
executive support are necessary to build an effective lessons learned program that is not 
an ad hoc or one-time event; it is an iterative process in need of continual management 
support, and processes and procedures must be in place to capture and document 
successes and failures. Finally, lessons-learned strategies must be incorporated into 
formal training and made available to decision makers.100 
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In addition to capturing lessons learned internally, it is also important to identify 
and analyze lessons learned from external sources, including other government 
organizations as well as repositories in the private domain. To accomplish this task, it is 
necessary to identify and access lessons-learned sources that relate to JTTF 
organizational mission areas, compile pertinent examples, and analyze materials 
collected. First, critical JTTF mission areas must be delineated. Thereafter, a data-
gathering template or matrix that reflects key mission areas can be created and used by 
collectors to streamline collection efforts. This matrix will provide an outline whereby 
narrative findings, best practices, and lessons learned can be organized into appropriate 
categories for analysis and retrieval. The axis of the matrix should encompass core JTTF 
functions and processes to include, but not be limited to: collaboration, information 
sharing, education/training, planning, and operational procedures. 
Once the template has been created, collection teams can begin populating the 
matrix with pertinent information. This information can then be qualitatively analyzed to 
extract useful lessons learned from the captured materials.101 This information should 
provide a contextual framework for drawing inductive conclusions to identify and 
implement positive results and provide an opportunity for future analysis.102  
Memorializing and quantifying lessons learned in a hierarchical matrix will ultimately 
provide the JTTF with a tool to recognize needs, identify gaps, and address potential 
deficiencies. 
Numerous external sources and repositories for lessons learned can be queried by 
collection teams to identify additional practices relevant to JTTF core mission areas.  
Available source documentation can include exercise reports, after-action reports, red 
team reports, case studies, and relevant articles.103 A number of repositories contain 
relevant and useful homeland security lessons learned: 
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(1) DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing website 
(2) National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(3) Center for Army Lessons Learned 
(4) Department of Defense Best Practices database 
(5) Department of Energy Lessons Learned database 
(6) Air War College 
(7) Naval Postgraduate School 
(8) Small Wars Centers for Excellence 
(9) Coast Guard Standard After Action Information and Lessons Learned 
System104 
D. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
The implementation of standardized written procedures, which detail roles, 
responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to databases and information sharing, 
will better enable participants to efficiently contribute to the JTTF mission. Following 
implementation, performance metrics and evaluation systems are needed to measure the 
progress and the efficacy of JTTF procedures. Currently there is no formal review and 
evaluation process for local JTTFs. The NJTTF provides policy and guidance on an ad 
hoc basis from FBI HQ in Washington, D.C. and must rely on input from coordinators in 
the field to evaluate progress. 
To rectify this problem and facilitate a hands-on approach, I suggest the NJTTF 
establish and implement an on-site review process in coordination with the 
counterterrorism division’s Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit (DTOU) and the 
International Terrorism Operations Sections I and II (ITOS I and II). This review process 
would be consistent with the new Strategy Management System. On-site review 
objectives would include the following: 
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(1) Coordinate and streamline JTTF policies and procedures to ensure 
seamless coordination between substantive FBI HQ Sections and Units 
and local JTTFs. 
(2) Ensure that mandatory education and training programs are seamlessly 
implemented in a consistent and equitable manner across the JTTF 
regions. 
(3) Identify, capture, and analyze best practices/lessons learned for potential 
dissemination if appropriate throughout the JTTF system. 
(4) Identify and evaluate innovative programs and/or initiatives. 
(5) Identify problems and impediments respective to local JTTFs and 
recommend prospective solutions. 
The NJTTF should also revise and implement the following outcome-oriented 
performance measures and/or metrics to evaluate local JTTFs and task force personnel: 
             (1) Quality and timeliness of information sharing with and between task force 
participants, their parent agencies, and non-participant Homeland Security stakeholders. 
(2) Outreach initiatives to enhance JTTF information sharing and 
collaborative partnerships. 
(3) Intelligence collection and dissemination practices that enhance and/or 
augment JTTF efforts. 
(4) HUMINT source development and utilization in furtherance of JTTF 
cases. 
Frequent transfers and turnover of JTTF Field Supervisors and Coordinators have 
had an adverse impact on continuity and consistency within the JTTF Program. To 
remedy the situation retired FBI Management personnel with JTTF experience could be 
hired as contractors on a regional basis to participate with NJTTF personnel on site 
surveys.  These Regional Coordinators would be a conduit for information sharing and 
coordination between the local JTTFs and FBIHQ. Regional coordinators would also 
provide oversight and accountability concerning JTTF initiatives. 
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E. COLLABORATION IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES (CHICAGO 
CASE STUDY) 
Effective collaboration, interagency cooperation, and the establishment of 
information sharing networks are necessary for the JTTF to achieve key objectives.  
Although traditional means are in place for information sharing and collaboration 
(including field office briefings, the JTTF executive board, and Law Enforcement 
Online), identifying and implementing best practices and lessons learned can have a 
profound impact on JTTF effectiveness. The Chicago Field Division Terrorism Liaison 
Officer program (TLO) is an example of a best practice that can be implemented in larger 
field offices.  
As part of the FBI’s transformation subsequent to 9/11, the reallocation of 
criminal investigators and investigatory resources to counterterrorism has resulted in 
diminished interaction with traditional community law enforcement. Because of this shift 
in focus, intelligence, domain awareness, and institutional knowledge assimilated through 
working criminal matters with local and state law enforcement has suffered.  Intelligence 
gained through partnerships leveraged on local policing is no longer as readily available. 
Because of the extensive and pervasive domain knowledge inherent in community 
policing, local law enforcement is often the most logical and prevalent source of 
intelligence that could prevent a terrorist attack105.  
Local law enforcement personnel, especially street-level officers, are a primary 
resource for detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Information and intelligence 
from community law enforcement is a critical resource in efforts to identify, disrupt, and 
prevent attacks by autonomous, self radicalized cells and/or organizations. Although 
relationships with state and local law enforcement have been developed through the 
JTTF, community law enforcement resources have not been fully optimized concerning 
prevention efforts, intelligence collection, and HUMINT development. 
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Smaller departments involved in community policing are often precluded by size 
and budget from formal participation on JTTFs. These departments are fertile repositories 
for intelligence information. Initiatives must be devised for procuring information from 
smaller departments to identify suspicious activity which may be a precursor to a terrorist 
attack. Likewise, local resources have not been fully exploited for HUMINT 
development and intelligence collection purposes. In many instances, local law 
enforcement personnel assigned to community agencies and departments do not have the 
requisite training to detect terrorist indicators, including information concerning 
suspicious activity that could be of intelligence value to the JTTF, FBI, and intelligence 
community (IC). 
The Chicago TLO program was implemented in the fall of 2004 to augment the 
Chicago JTTF by engaging and integrating local and state law enforcement into the 
homeland security mission. A primary objective of the TLOC program is to enhance 
collaboration with local and state law enforcement agencies not represented on the JTTF. 
The program was designed to enlist community departments in prevention efforts by 
providing training to develop the skills and expertise to enable local law enforcement to 
identify and report suspicious activity that might be indicative of a terrorist attack.  The 
program encourages networking and provides a conduit for reporting information. Over 
400 state and local departments in the Chicago FBI field division territory were contacted 
and solicited to participate in the program. Over 300 departments and agencies currently 
participate and selected personnel receive extensive JTTF-sponsored training in terrorism 
and homeland security matters. 
The program has been successful in as much as participating TLOs have been an 
excellent resource for detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Local TLOs provide 
intelligence and tactically assist the Chicago JTTF in numerous investigations that impact 
their community or jurisdiction. The TLO program has provides the JTTF an avenue to 
collect and analyze information generated through routine law enforcement activity for 
intelligence collection purposes and HUMINT development. 
The TLO program is an iterative process where training is provided and TLO 
members are tasked by the JTTF to export this knowledge back to their agencies and 
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communities. TLOs also assist with intelligence collection; for example, Chicago-area 
TLOs were provided a template and requested to identify key infrastructure assets within 
their community. Once these critical infrastructure sites were identified, TLOs were 
tasked with establishing liaisons and developing information sharing conduits with 
critical infrastructure personnel to include, but not limited to, public health officials, first 
responders, and private industry stakeholders. Community outreach initiatives such as the 
program detailed above enables TLOs to educate and sensitize community stakeholders 
concerning Homeland Security prerogatives.  By expanding the JTTF network, TLOs 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
This research analyzed external evaluations of the JTTF Program by NAPA and 
DOJ OIG in 2003 and 2005 respectively.  It also details a comprehensive internal survey 
conducted by the CTD in 2006-2007. The CTD survey was significant in as much as it 
corroborated the fact that inconsistencies previously chronicled in external evaluations 
had not been rectified and recommendations for improvement had yet to be fully 
embraced. Specifically, recommendations to revamp core strategies, improve human 
resource planning, and develop the training necessary to build on requisite core 
capabilities and skills needed to accomplish task force objectives had not been achieved.  
Research determined the JTTF training and development program is ill-defined and lacks 
the outcome-oriented performance measures necessary to assess training efficacy, 
strategies, operations, and resources. 
In sum, research results suggest FBI-CTD is not providing JTTF members with 
the tools they need to do their job effectively. The JTTF survey determined JTTF 
members received insufficient substantive training, database access and training, and 
source training, and availability and access to support personnel is not sufficient to aid 
investigations. In addition, there were significant differences regarding the provision of 
these tools according to geographic region, JTTF membership status, and JTTF agency 
membership. Results suggest TFOs receive less training, access, and tools to aid 
investigations overall than FBI JTTF members. The aforementioned findings run counter 
to the JTTF concept in as much as TFOs are tasked with the same responsibilities as their 
FBI counterparts concerning counterterrorism investigations. Moreover, these inequities 
are an impediment to optimum participation and utilization of the unique knowledge, 
skills, and experience that non-FBI task force members can contribute.  
Research determined that, on an organizational level, the JTTF lacks systemic 
processes to identify and capture lessons learned and best practices to encapsulate 
accumulated knowledge, insights, and procedures so these processes can be utilized to 
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enhance job performance and maximize efficiency. Finally, performance metrics and 
evaluation systems are needed to provide oversight and accountability and measure the 
progress and the efficacy of JTTF programs. 
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
To optimize effectiveness, it is necessary to identify and implement best and/or 
smart practices, especially those plans, policies, and procedures which ensure the skills, 
experience, and expertise of task force participants are maximized and seamlessly 
integrated into the JTTF Program. The implementation of standardized written 
procedures which detail roles, responsibilities, training, orientation, and access to 
databases and information sharing will better enable participants to efficiently contribute 
to the JTTF mission. Institutionalizing an innovative culture and framework that provides 
the flexibility to evaluate and develop necessary skills and competencies in participant 
stakeholders is essential for the future success of the JTTF program.  
Key practices and lessons learned from successful strategic change initiatives 
undertaken by public and private organizations can be used as a model to facilitate FBI 
transformational efforts.106  These include, but are not limited to, the following: 
1. Ensure that the top leadership drives the transformation; 
2. Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals; 
3. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities; 
4. Set implementation goals and a timeline; 
5. Dedicate and implementation team to manage the process; 
6. Use a performance management system to define responsibility and establish 
accountability; 
7. Establish a communication strategy; 
8. Involve employees; and 
9. Seek input and collaboration from internal and external stakeholders.107 
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Department of Homeland security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: 
General Accounting Office, November 14, 2002). 
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The JTTF can emulate best practices from high-performance organizations that 
reinforce transformation efforts through performance management systems. These 
systems align organizational objectives with individual employee performance 
expectations. Successful organizations create linkages between individual performance 
and organizational success. By engaging in these activities, organizations can create a 
results-oriented culture that is collaborative in nature.108  Desired outcomes, core values, 
critical individual competencies, and agency transformational objectives must align with 
the strategic plan. Moreover, planning and budget processes must also integrate the 
strategic plan and resource needs.109 As part of the process, education training and 
development must be tailored to align workforce needs, goals, and objectives with 
mission-critical functions. This process includes implementing a long-term strategic 
human capital approach that integrates training and development opportunities with 
anticipated future critical needs and skills.110 
To achieve strategic objectives pursuant with the Strategy Management System, 
training development programs must be prioritized to develop the skills and 
competencies necessary to facilitate transformation and achieve operational objectives.  
To ensure consistency, the JTTF training program must include a core curriculum that is 
coordinated, implemented, and applied in a uniform manner throughout the 102 local 
JTTF locations. Education and training must be evaluated and assessed in conjunction 
with strategic practices and organizational goals. This process must be collaborative, 
flexible, adaptive, and address specific needs. An evaluation process that incorporates 
feedback from multiple perspectives is needed so adjustments and improvements can be  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
107 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), FBI reorganization: progress made in efforts to 
transform, but major challenges continue, GAO-03-759T (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, 
June 2002), 3. 
108 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Results oriented cultures: creating a clear linkage 
between individual performance and organizational success, GAO-03-488 (Washington, D.C.: General 
Accounting Office, March 14, 2003), 2. 
109 GAO, FBI reorganization,  4. 
110 Ibid., 7. 
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made as necessary. An effective education and training program will ensure skills and 
competencies are developed in the JTTF workforce that support and align with FBI and 
Homeland Security strategic goals. 
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
On a macro level, the psychological and structural processes necessary to initiate 
and sustain transformation and organizational change in the homeland security domain is 
fertile ground for additional research and study. Performance metrics, oversight and 
accountability, best practices, and collaborative processes can be evaluated and 
improved. On a micro level, a follow-up JTTF survey should be conducted to evaluate 
implemented recommendations and core processes. A sufficient amount of time should 
be allowed for changes to take effect. It is recommended that future surveys include 
questions from the current survey in order for post-survey analysis to be conducted to 
allow a statistical measurement concerning the effectiveness of program changes relative 
to identified deficiencies. 
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APPENDIX A: NJTTF REGIONAL MAP 
 
Region I: New York, Boston, Albany, Buffalo, Newark, New Haven, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and Baltimore 
 
Region II: Norfolk, Richmond, San Juan, WFO, Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbia, 
Knoxville, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Detroit, Memphis, Milwaukee, 
Springfield, and Louisville 
 
Region III: Birmingham, Denver, Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Dallas, El Paso, Kansas 
City, San Antonio, Houston, Jackson, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jacksonville, Miami, 
Minneapolis, Mobile, Omaha, and Tampa 
 
Region IV: Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San 
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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) 
TELEPHONE SURVEY 
 
Field Office:                                   
 
Date of Survey:                                                    
 
Agency (Check One):  
                  FBI SA  
                  Federal TFO 
                 State TFO 
                 Local TFO 




Status:                 Part-Time Member  
                   Full-Time Member1.
 How long have you been a Law Enforcement Officer?               Years               Months   
 A. Time as an FBI Agent                Years               Months     
 B. Time as a State/local law enforcement officer                Years               Months 
 C. Time as another government agency law enforcement officer                Years               
Months  
 
2.   How long have you been assigned to your current JTTF?                Years               Months 
 
3.   Are you assigned to a JTTF Annex/RA?                 Yes               No 
 
4.   Have you received the following subject-matter counterterrorism training: 
 A.  International Terrorism                Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area: 
   _____ It was not offered to me 
   _____ Time constraints 
   _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities 
   _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level 
   _____ Other 
__________________________________________________________ 
Source of training:  
      FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy?                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Field Office training                Yes                  No     
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  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
             
  
            
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                         
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Non-FBI training                Yes                  No    
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                            
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
 B.  Domestic Terrorism                Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area: 
   _____ It was not offered to me 
   _____ Time constraints 
   _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities 
   _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
  Source of training:  
      FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy?                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
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  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Field Office training                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
             
  
            
  
            
  
            
  
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Non-FBI training                Yes                  No    
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
  
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
 C. Weapons of Mass Destruction                Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area: 
   _____ It was not offered to me 
   _____ Time constraints 
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   _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities 
   _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
  Source of training:   
      FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy?                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                          
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Field Office training                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
             
  
            
  
            
  
            
  
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Non-FBI training                Yes                  No    
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
 118
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 





 D.  Muslim/Arab Culture                Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from receiving training in this area: 
   _____ It was not offered to me 
   _____ Time constraints 
   _____ Lack of awareness regarding training opportunities 
   _____ Lack of financial resources at the field office level 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
  Source of training:    
      FBIHQ sponsored training, such as Virtual Academy?                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
  
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Field Office training                Yes                  No     
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
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  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
  Non-FBI training                Yes                  No    
  If yes, list the names of the in-services you have attended: 
            
  
            
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                            
  If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  __________ 
  (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
 Other Comments:                          
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5. Since your assignment to the JTTF, have you received FBI legal training?                 Yes                  
No 
 A. Have you requested a NSL?                  Yes                  No 
 B. Have you prepared or helped prepare a FISA request package?                  Yes                  
No   
 
6.   Since your assignment to the JTTF, have you received access to the following computer 
systems: 
 A. FBINET Intranet                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 B. ACS (Automated Case Support)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 C. TA System (Telephone Applications)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
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   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 D. IDW (Investigative Data Warehouse)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 E. Guardian / E-Guardian                  Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 F. DEEP (Data Extraction and Extension Project)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
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   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
G. SCION (Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network)             Yes              
No 
  If no, do you have a SCIF at your location:              Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 
 H. SIPRNET / JWICS                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 I. Internet (e.g., Google)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
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   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No  
 J. Lexis Nexis                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 K. ChoicePoint / Autotrack                   Yes                  No                  
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 L. LEO (Law Enforcement Online)                   Yes                  No 
  If no, what has prevented you from obtaining access to this system: 
   _____ Did not know about this system 
   _____ Lack of access to computer equipment/technology 
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   _____ Completed paperwork to request access but access has not yet been 
granted 
   _____ Other 
___________________________________________________________ 
  If yes, have you received training on this system?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, have you used this resource?                Yes                  No 
  If yes, was it useful in supporting your assigned investigation(s)?               Yes                
No 
 
 Other Comments:                       
             
             
             
             
             
             
   
7.   Have you ever been assigned as the primary case agent in a FBI CT investigation(s)? 
              Yes                  No 
 
8. Have you ever been assigned as a co-case agent in a FBI CT investigation(s)? 
              Yes                  No 
 
9. Do you participate in file review sessions with your JTTF Supervisor?              Yes               
No 
 
10. Do you currently operate a FBI-symboled source/asset(s) who is reporting on 
counterterrorism  matters or assist in operating a source?  
                Yes                  No If yes, how many currently? __________________ 
 A. Have you ever operated a symboled source(s) or asset(s) during your JTTF assignment or 
assisted with operating a source?                Yes                No 
 B.     Have you received FBI training on how to operate a symboled source(s) /asset(s)?    
                     Yes            No 
          If yes, how would you rate the quality of this training:  ___________ 
          (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
 
11.   Do you have adequate access to the following investigative support: 
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 A. Intelligence Analysts                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
B. Financial Analysts                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 C. Field Intelligence Group                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 D. Surveillance Support (e.g., SOG, SSG)                Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 E. Technical Support (e.g., TTA)                 Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 
12. Do you have adequate number of the following investigative support: 
 A. Intelligence Analysts                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 B. Financial Analysts                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 C. Field Intelligence Group                  Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 D. Surveillance Support (e.g., SOG, SSG)                Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 E. Technical Support (e.g., TTA)                 Yes                  No     ______Don't 
Know 
 
 Other Comments:          
             
             
             
              
             
             
              
                                                                                                                                                      
13.   (If  TFO) How often is your agency's management briefed by the FBI Field Office 
Management? 
 _____ Daily 
 _____ Weekly 
 _____ Monthly 
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 _____ Quarterly 
 _____ Semi-annually 
 _____ Annually 
 _____ Never 
 If never, please explain:          
  
            
  
            
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 To your knowledge, who from the FBI conducts these briefings the majority of the time: 
  _____ FBI SSA 
  _____ ASAC 
  _____ SAC 




14.    Overall, has the JTTF Field Office Management provided appropriate leadership and 
management?   
        (Rate on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = Poor, 3 = Good, and 5 = Exceptional) 
    Leadership    Management   
 A. SSA                                                 
Please explain basis for rating below 3:  
   _____ General lack of contact with management 
   _____ Management not familiar with subject matter of investigations   




 B. ASAC                                                 
Please explain basis for rating below 3:  
   _____ General lack of contact with management 
   _____ Management not familiar with subject matter of investigations   





 C. SAC                                                 
Please explain basis for rating below 3:  
   _____ General lack of contact with management 
   _____ Management not familiar with subject matter of investigations   




 Final Comments:            
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